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Chapter 1: ICT, Democracy, and Geopolitics—U.S.
Approach to Foreign Policy

“All of America’s strategic interests—from promoting
prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before
they threaten our territory—are served by enlarging the
community of democratic and free market nations. Thus,
working with new democratic states to help preserve them
as democracies committed to free markets and respect for
human rights, is a key part of our national security strategy.
One of the most gratifying and encouraging.” 1
Bill Clinton’s National Security
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

“…a democracy cannot survive without civic virtue…The
political challenge for people around the world today, is not just
to replace authoritarian regimes by democratic ones. Beyond
this, it is to make democracy work for ordinary people.” 2
Fidel Valdez Ramos
President of the Philippines

Over the past 20 years a number of important developments in the field of
Information Communication Technology (ICT) have led to significant changes in the
way we do business, communicate with each other, as well as receive and transmit
information. Much attention is paid to the way ICT has transformed our business and
government practices, and there are numerous publications on this subject. However,
very little has been said or written about the way ICTs impact our ability to challenge our

1

The White House, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” February 1996.
Quoted in Mitchell, Lincoln, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution,
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 13.
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Sen, Amartya, Development as Freedom, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 155.
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governments, and produce revolutionary movements with ease never before thought
possible. Nineteenth century revolutionaries Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels would have
been truly envious of the world today, of the way that various groups and individuals are
able to exchange information with lighting speed and gather support from likeminded
individuals around the world to support their cause. “Groups of any size, from two to
millions, can reach each other and use the Net to promote an agenda. Their members and
followers can come from any geographical region on the Net, and they can attempt to
influence foreign policy anywhere in the world.”3
This study will argue that many of the revolutionary movements that have taken
place in the last decade would not have occurred had it not been for the various
advancements in Information Communication Technologies. In addition to this, it will
assert that advances in ICT are generally positive for mankind, although in some
instances they can be employed in ways that are actually detrimental to individuals and
society. This is particularly the case when governments utilize ICT in order to
manipulate their constituents, or when it is utilized by autocratic regimes in order to exert
greater control over their citizens. Having said that, much emphasis will be placed on the
human factor, which was essential in every revolutionary movement discussed in this
paper. While various advances in ICT certainly made the task of challenging each
regime more achievable, it was up to individuals to initiate and drive every political
transformation.
To date there have been four ‘non-violent’ revolutions in the former Soviet
Union. In every instance the opposition groups utilized ICT in order to achieve their
3

Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy,
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 243.

4

goals. The methods and level of use, however, differed substantially depending on when
the event took place and the extent of technological development in each country. In
addition to this, the achievements of the movements also differed substantially, and it is
still not possible to really determine whether each revolution was successful.
Although the citizens of Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova had unique
justifications for mobilizing an opposition movement against their governments, all of the
revolutions were triggered by a single element—flawed elections. According to Thomas
Carothers, Vice President of Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:
“When an authoritarian leader gambles on elections to legitimate his rule, then
outside aid to help make the elections as free and fair as possible can be
valuable…Where dictators allow no or next-to-no political space, the ability of
outside groups to encourage change is much more limited.” 4
As a result, in each circumstance the citizens of these countries were determined to rid
their nation of corruption, economic poverty, and injustice by overthrowing the powers in
charge, which they viewed as directly responsible for these shortcomings. This was done
by exposing all the failures of the current government and promising the people
economic prosperity, freedom, and democracy once the government is replaced. Before
going any further, however, it is important to underline some key aspects of freedom and
democracy, concepts that were fundamental in driving the revolutions in the former
Soviet Union.
Freedom and Democracy
Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize-winning economist and Professor of Economics and
Philosophy at Harvard University, describes five instrumental concepts, which taken
together, encompass the general idea of freedom. These include political freedoms,
4

Carothers, Thomas, “Why Dictators Aren’t Dominoes,” Foreign Policy, (July/August 2003).
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economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective
security. 5 According to Freedom House, a not-for-profit NGO that provides an annual
report on the level of freedom around the world, the level of freedom in any given
country is based on Political Rights and Civil Liberties. 6 In Development as Freedom,
Amartya Sen also writes that “political rights, including freedom of expression and
discussion, are not only pivotal in inducing social responses to economic needs, they are
also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves.” 7 Consequently, Sen
concludes that democracy is something that is acquired via expression of, and intertwined
with, freedom. Having said that, the idea of democracy is not something that can be
described definitively since it can take many different forms. As a result, there is often
misunderstanding among individuals that attempt to instill democracy in their countries,
since they expect instantaneous change in ways which the West tends to ‘advertise’ it.
Despite this, there are some general concepts that help clarify its meaning.
According to Seymour Martin Lipset, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and
Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, “Democracy is a system in which
no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule and,
therefore, no one can abrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power.” 8
Moreover, Keith Jaggers, Professor of Political Science at University of Colorado and

5

Sen, Development as Freedom, 53.
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Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org Accessed on 6/19/2009
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Sen, Development as Freedom, 154.
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Lipset, Seymour Martin, quoted in Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr’s (1995) “Tracking Democracy’s
Third Wave with Polity III,” 469.

6

Ted Robert Gurr, Professor of Political Science at University of Maryland, write that
there are three essential elements in democracy:
(1) Political Choices: existence of institutions and procedures which allow
citizens to choose their leaders and the policies that impact their lives.
(2) Institutional Constraints: existence of ‘checks and balances’ on executive
power.
(3) Civil Liberties: guarantees of liberty in daily life and freedom for acts of
political participation. 9
Jaggers and Gurr conclude that while democratic regimes can occasionally lack some of
these characteristics, they should generally have most of them in place in order to remain
democratic. In spite of democracy’s hard to define qualities, however, many Western
countries, and the U.S. in particular, place great emphasis on freedom and democracy
promotion around the world.
U.S. and Democracy Assistance
In addition to use of ICT, rigged elections, and promises of freedom and
democracy, the four revolutionary movements were also similar in that to some degree,
the United States was involved in supporting the opposition in every instance. According
Patrick Callahan, Professor of Political Science at DePaul University, the ideas of
democracy promotion and liberalism 10 are among the most important factors

9

Jaggers, Keith and Ted Robert Gurr, “Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave with Polity III,” Journal of
Peace Research, Volume 32, Number 4, (1995), 469-482.
10

In Logics of American Foreign Policy, Callahan writes that the concept of liberalism can be summarized
in four main points: “(1) The U.S. should seek the expansion of liberty because the U.S. and the world are
better off when trade is free, nations are governed democratically, human rights are honored, and nations
have self-determination because liberty promotes prosperity, peace, and cooperation. (2) The logic of
liberalism makes no specific assumptions about the power of the U.S. beyond the rather general assumption
that it has the capability to increase liberty to some extent; however, any serious program actively to
expand liberty necessarily makes expansive assumptions about U.S. Power. (3) Promoting liberty is a moral
obligation as well as a means to advance U.S. interests. (4) The promotion of liberty has been a salient
theme in the U.S. policy discourse since the country gained its independence; since the late 1800s, it has
significantly shaped what the U.S. does abroad.” (Callahan: 2004, 74)
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determining U.S. foreign relations. 11 As a result, although in the last few decades there
has been a more noticeable backlash against U.S. intervention in some parts of the world,
establishing and defending democracy abroad has been a key foreign policy principle of
the United States since the very beginning.
According to Lincoln Mitchell, Professor of International Politics at Columbia
University, democracy promotion was central to President Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a
post-World War I world, and World War II was also oftentimes presented as a war to
protect freedom and democracy.12 Moreover, on June 29, 1953, the U.S. National
Security Council issued a Top Secret Report Number 74: NCS 158 titled United States
Objectives and Action to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States. The report provided
detailed description on the U.S. plans to undermine communism around the world, and
listed a number of key ‘psychological objectives’ as well as short-term and long-term
‘courses of action.’ The first objective that the report lists is “to nourish resistance to
communist oppression throughout satellite Europe, short of mass rebellion in areas under
Soviet military control, and without compromising its spontaneous nature.” 13
During the Reagan administration, democracy promotion was implemented via
‘Project Democracy,’ which consisted of “exchange programs and other cultural
activities aimed at exposing people from communist countries to American-style
democracy.” 14 This was followed by the 1992 ‘Freedom Support Act’ which

11

Callahan, Patrick, Logics of American Foreign Policy: Theories of America’s World Role, (New York,
NY: Pearson Education, Inc., 2004), 83.

12

Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy, 10.
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“United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States,” Document No. 74:
NCS 158, June 1953 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/ Accessed on 6/26/2009.
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Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy, 11.
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appropriated millions of dollars towards the countries of the former USSR for the
purpose of promoting freedom and democracy. 15 According to a 2004 ‘State Department
Report’:
“In the twelve years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. Government
(USG)—funded assistance programs have been a key element of the U.S. policy
to support the political and economic transformation of the former Soviet states.
By helping move the Eurasian countries in the direction of democracy and
market-based economies, these programs promote long-term stability in the
region and contribute to U.S. national security.” 16
Many individuals, however, criticize the United States for being involved in
internal affairs of other countries, and a number of regimes adamantly oppose any U.S.
intervention within their borders. In the words of Ukzbekistan’s President Islam
Karimov, “Think for yourselves, dear friends, exporting democracy and introducing it
forcibly from abroad is in itself against the nature of the concept of democracy.” 17
Others claim that the U.S. is exporting revolutions and that its motives are not as pure as
U.S. officials claim. 18 The bottom line, however, is that United States is interested in
peace and stability around the world in order to protect itself from unnecessary threats,
and to provide businesses with the ability to compete in foreign markets. 19 Moreover, it

15

Anable, David, “The Role of Georgia’s Media—and Western Aid—in the Rose Revolution,” The
Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Volume 11, Issue 3, (Summer 2006), 20.

16

“2004 State Department Report.” Quoted in David Anable, The Role of Georgia’s Media, 20.
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Islam Karimov, quoted in David Anable’s The Role of Georgia’s Media, 36.

18

Open Society Institute’s (OSI) Gordana Jankovic responds to the accusations that OSI (which was
founded by George Soros) is responsible for producing revolutions by stating that: “this is absolutely far
away from the truth. OSI is not there to create revolution. It is not there to stimulate revolution. It is there
to help people learn how to better run their own societies and governments. It is they who can decide how
they should do their work.” She then goes on to say that this false accusation is making “it much more
difficult to encourage and stimulate the civil society groups that remain in critical watchdog roles in
Georgia and elsewhere.” (Quoted in David Anable, The Role of Georgia’s Media, 31).

19

Callahan, Patrick, Logics of American Foreign Policy, 82.
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is significantly cheaper than pursuing more aggressive means of foreign intervention.
According to The New York Times, the U.S. spent approximately $350 million on
democracy promotion in Eastern Europe and the former USSR in 1991-2005. 20 By
comparison, the U.S. has spent almost $700 billion in Iraq as of 2009, and a
Congressional Research Service Study conducted in 2008 estimated that approximately
$686 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars were spent on the Vietnam War, and $4.1
trillion on World War II. 21
U.S. and Geopolitics
In addition to democracy assistance reasons, the United States also has a specific
interest in the Caucasus and Eurasia which stem from a number of important concepts in
geopolitical theory. According to several noted scholars of international relations,
including Zbigniew Brzezinski, George Friedman, and Robert Strausz-Hupe, many of the
countries that comprised the former Soviet Union are located in key strategic areas that
are crucial for the purpose of maintaining control in the case of Russia, or undermining
Russia’s control, in the case of the U.S. and other Western powers.
As far back as 1904, Sir Halford Mackinder, one of the founders of Geopolitics,
and author of several important books including Democratic Ideas and Reality, wrote that
the area occupied by the Russian Empire and countries of Central Asia has the potential
to be self-sustainable and control many of the world’s resources without the need for
developing access to, or control of, the oceans. He went on to say that this was “the pivot

20

O’Connor, Eileen and David Hoffman, “Media in Iraq: The Fallacy of Psy-Ops,” The New York Times,
December 16, 2005.
21

Barnes, Julian E., “The Nation: Iraq War’s Cost to Pass Vietnam’s,” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2009.
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region of the world’s politics.” 22 In 1917, he also introduced what was called the
‘Heartland Theory,’ which stated:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the world. 23
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor of American foreign policy at Johns
Hopkins University and former national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, “it is
on the globe’s most important playing field—Eurasia—that a potential rival to America
might at some point arise. Thus, focusing on the key players and properly assessing the
terrain has to be the point of departure for formulation of American geostrategy for the
long-term management of America’s Eurasian geopolitical interests.” 24 As a result, a
number of former Soviet countries, including Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and
Moldova, are strategically crucial for maintaining, or acquiring, control of the
“Heartland.” 25

22

Mackinder, Halford, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal, Volume 23,
Number 4, (April 1904), 423.
23

Mackinder, Halford, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, (New
York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1919).
24

Brzezinski, Zbignew, The Grand Chessboard, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), 38.

25

A number of individuals, including writer Rick Rozoff, claim that the United States and NATO are
encircling Russia in order to gain domination of the world. In a recent article he writes, “The three nations
of the Sourth Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—are increasingly becoming the pivot upon
which that strategy turns. With the Black Sea and the Balkans to its west, Russia to its north, Iran and the
Arab world to the south and southeast and the Caspian Sea and central Asia to the east, the South Caucasus
is uniquely situated to become the nucleus of an international geostrategic campaign by major Western
powers to achieve domination of Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa and as such the world.” For
more information see Rick Rozoff, “Eurasian Crossroads: The Caucasus in US-NATO War Plans,” Global
Research, April 8, 2009. http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=13101 Accessed on
4/12/2009.
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Chapter 2:
History and Political Use of ICT

“In 1989, the world witnessed a new power:
communications’ ability to alter Europe’s political
geography.”
Royce J. Ammon 26

“It was revolution by fax machine, computer and word of
mouth, by photocopier and wall poster, by direct-dialed
phone calls, shortwave radio and letters in the mail.”
Newsweek, 1989 27

Background on ICT
According to John Pavlik, Professor of Journalism at Rutgers University, when
Samuel Morse, inventor of the electromagnetic telegraph, traveled to France in 1893 and
saw Louis Daguerre’s newest invention, the daguerreotype, he wrote that it was “one of
the most beautiful discoveries of the age.” When Walt Whitman saw this early form of
photography, he wrote “Ah! What tales might those pictures tell if their mute lips had the
power of speech!” Shortly after this, newspapers across the world began to utilize
photography, and with it, a new era of ICT was launched.
After successfully enabling individuals on land to transmit human voices to
faraway ships, radio was also introduced into the mix in 1906. Less than 10 years later,
advancements in radio technologies allowed it to carry the same human voice across the
Atlantic Ocean. “Then on election night 1920, station KDKA in Pittsburgh,

26

Ammon, Royce J., Global Television and the Shaping of World Politics: CNN, Telediplomacy, and
Foreign Policy, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2001), 33.
27

Martz, Larry et al., “Revolution by Information. China’s Students Wage High-and Low-tech War on the
Blackout,” Newsweek, June 19, 1989.
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Pennsylvania, inaugurated service by broadcasting election returns in what is generally
regarded as the first commercial broadcast of radio.” 28 By early 1930s, radio was already
the primary news source for many individuals, providing media with unparalleled ability
to supply instantaneous information. 29
At about the same time as radio was quickly spreading across the world, another
important development in the area of ICT was taking place, the invention of the
television. Television, which means seeing images at a distance, combined “radio’s
power of hearing with the greater power of seeing.” 30 Since then, both of these powerful
technologies, along with other ICTs like telephones, video and audio tapes, cameras, as
well as satellite technology, have been providing information on, and contributing to,
political change throughout the world. The biggest transformation, however, occurred
with popularization of the Internet in the 1990s.
As recently as 1987 the Internet consisted of approximately ten thousand linked
computers. In 1989 that number grew to one hundred thousand, and by 1992 there were
over 1 million computers linked to the Internet, with more being added at a rate of 20
percent per month. Because of this rapid growth, there were over 165 million people
connected to the Internet by mid-1999. 31 Today, there are almost 1.6 billion internet
users around the world 32 , which means that almost one out of every four individuals

28

Ammon, Global Television, 32.

29

Ibid., 33.

30

Ammon, Global Television, 33.

31

Collings, Anthoniy, Words of Fire: Independent Journalists Who Challenge Dictators, Druglords, and
Other Enemies of a Free Press, (New York University Press: New York, NY, 2001), 167.
32

Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics (as of 3/31/2009),
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm Accessed on 7/3/2009.
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around the world is using the Internet. In addition to this, while only a decade ago
Internet access was extremely disproportionate, with Europe and North America counting
for nearly eighty percent of the world’s total, 33 today the situation is much more
encouraging. Since 2000, Africa’s Internet user growth increased by a staggering 1,100
percent, and the Middle East experienced growth of 1,296 percent. Internet use in Latin
America and the Caribbean also increased by 861 percent, while Asia’s use grew by 475
percent. During the same time, Europe and North America only experienced an increase
of 274 and 173 percent, respectively. 34 What this means is that although there is still a
significant digital divide between countries like the U.S. and the rest of the world, the gap
is rapidly narrowing.
One of the biggest impacts of the Internet was the way in which it transformed
access to information. According to a report published by Freedom House in 2000,
“Censors have dogged every new communication technology since the creation
of movable type in the sixteenth century, through the innovation of the telephone,
radio, and television in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Internet,
however, is the most formidable challenge to the censor. Cyberspace is
everywhere, but headquartered nowhere. No single government can yet control a
message as it originates in another country.” 35
Actions by governments that previously went unchecked or unnoticed can no longer
remain concealed. The Internet also provides various activist groups with unprecedented
ability to initiate and drive political change. Individuals around the world are beginning
to question and challenge their governments with increasing rates of success. “Some of

33

Collings, Words of Fire, 167.

34

Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics (as of 3/31/2009)

35

Press Freedom Survey 2000, New York: Freedom House, May 2000.
http://www.freedom house.org/news/pr122199.html
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these advantages appear to be merely evolutionary improvements on ‘older’ technologies
such as the telephone and fax machine in terms of speed and cost. Other advantages
appear to be truly revolutionary, reflections of the Internet’s unique nature.” 36
History of ICT Use 37
After decades of authoritarianism and communist oppression, Eastern and Central
European regimes finally began to feel the pressure of public dissent in 1989. Although
small anti-government oppositions did occur in many of these countries throughout the
years, it was not until 1989 that significant resistance movements materialized in the
Soviet bloc. Tired of repression, low living standards and isolation, Eastern and Central
European citizens were determined to take advantage of what appeared to be a weakening
of the Soviet hegemony, in order to bring change to their countries. In addition to the
abovementioned factors, a number of different Information Communication Technologies
were utilized in the 1980s in unprecedented ways. Developments in ICT during the
previous twenty years, which included extraordinary advances in telephone, computer,
video recording, and television technologies, allowed individuals to organize protests,
spread information, and communicate with each other using methods over which the
Soviet governments had little or no control. So while increased availability and
advancements in ICT were not the most important variables in igniting the revolutions of
1989, they played a role of extreme significance. 38

36

Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 158.
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The focus of this paper is on revolutionary events which utilized various forms of ICT. As a result, while
there were a number of revolutionary attempts 1989-2009 that occurred in the former Soviet bloc,
(including Bulgaria in 1989, Azerbaijan/Moldova in 2005, and Belarus/Uzbekistan in 2006), only those
examples which are relevant to this study will be addressed.
38

Hester, Al and L. Earle Reybold, The Incredible Demise of Communism, in Revolutions for Freedom:
The Mass Media in Eastern and Central Europe, (The University of Georgia Press: Athens, GA, 1991), 2.

15

According to Albert Hester, director of the James M. Cox Center for International
Mass Communication Training and Research at University of Georgia,
“Once revolutionary change began moving in one country, news of it spread with
incredible speed. It was not possible, as it had been even a few years ago, to
insulate and isolate oppressed populations from change. Now, much of the world
is attuned to the same news agendas. The image on the television screen is too
powerful to be denied.” 39
As a result, the wave of protests that began to spread across Eastern and Central Europe
in the middle of 1989 resulted in the fact that most of the communist regimes in the
Soviet bloc were overthrown only two years later. Citizens of the German Democratic
Republic, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, all saw the end of communist
rule. 40 By autumn of 1991, the few governments that were able to temporarily suppress
the opposition movements were also overthrown as the Soviet Union dissolved.
Czechoslovakia
In July, 1989, Czechoslovakian Communist Party First Secretary Milos Jakes
made a speech during which he said that it was a mistake to arrest Czech revolutionary
Vaclav Havel, “because the more we persecute him, the greater a hero he will be.” He
then went on to say that “We must not direct our hits directly against Havel, but against
the others. Otherwise cultural figures all over the world and the democratic world will
stand up in his defense." 41 Although Jakes made this speech during a private meeting
that was only supposed to be heard by other communist officials, this event was secretly
taped by someone present at the meeting, and later supplied to several Western radio
39

Hester, The Incredible Demise, 2.

40

Ibid, 1.

41

Luers, William, “Czechoslovakia: Road to Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 69, Issue 2 (Spring
1990), 94.
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stations, which immediately put the recording on the air. 42 This event created uproar in
the country and caused the Czech Party leaders to loose even more credibility. Moreover,
many attribute this recording to have been a key factor in building Havel’s national and
international recognition, which eventually led to his election as President of
Czechoslovakia in December 1989, and President of the Czech Republic following a split
with Slovakia in 1993.
Another crucial factor behind the success of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ was the
media in general. According to William Luers, former U.S. Ambassador to
Czechoslovakia:
“the sight and sound of the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Leipzig,
Berlin and Prague; East German emigrants jumping over fences and into the West
German embassy; the tearing down of the Berlin Wall—these events seemed to
give instant courage and a sense of community to cowed citizens of
Czechoslovakia.” 43
Moreover, availability of foreign media, which included Voice of America, Radio Free
Europe and BBC, allowed individuals in the Czech Republic to hear an alternative
version to the state-controlled media, and caused the authorities to loose much of their
legitimacy. This was particularly the case, after December 1988, when the Czechoslovak
authorities stopped jamming Radio Free Europe. 44 As a result, radio, television, as well
as illegal video news like the Original Video Journal, all contributed to the
transformation of Czechoslovakian society and further fueled the existing dissent. 45

42

Ganley, Gladys D., The Exploding Political Power of Personal Media, (Ablex Publishing Corporation:
Norwood, NJ, 1992), 39.

43

Luers, “Czechoslovakia,” 90-91.

44

Ibid, 91.

45

For more details regarding Czechoslovakia’s ‘Velvet Revolution,’ see Luers (1990), “Czechoslovakia:
Road to Revolution.”
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Romania
The pattern of revolutionary movements during the 1989-91 was similar
throughout Eastern and Central Europe. Protesters gathered in the streets demanding
change in leadership. The anxious authorities would attempt to intervene, resulting in
some violence, occasional injuries, and even a few deaths. Romania, however,
underwent a very different experience on its road to democracy, resulting in hundreds of
individuals loosing their lives. 46
In July 1989 a Hungarian television station aired a 40-minute interview with
Reverend Laszlo Tokes that was recorded earlier in the year by two Canadians, Michel
Clair and Reagan Roy. During this interview, Reverend Tokes, who was ethnically
Hungarian and lived in the city of Timisoara, on the border between Romania and
Hungary, spoke to Clair and Roy about human rights, corruption, and freedom.
Moreover, he went on to talk about the physical and spiritual degradation of Romania
under Nicolae Ceausescu’s rule. 47 Although the program was aired in Hungary, a large
number of Romanians were able to view it, and immediately identified with what Tokes
was saying. According to Gladys Ganley, in many ways this interview was the spark that
ignited Romania’s 1989 revolution. 48
After Ceausecsu found out about this interview, he was furious and attempted to
deport Reverend Laszlo Tokes. On December 15, 1989, when a crowd gathered around
Tokes in order to protect him, “Romanian troops and police opened fire from tanks and

46

Hester, The Incredible Demise, 9.

47

Ganley, The Exploding Political Power, 50.

48

Ibid., 39.
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helicopter gunships” at the crowd. 49 Following this event, protests quickly spread
throughout the country, eventually reaching Bucharest on December 21, when over one
hundred thousand demonstrators gathered on the streets of the capital. On December 25,
Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu were executed, and the Romanian government
overthrown. 50
Another important way in which ICTs were able to impact the Romanian
Revolution is exemplified by the exaggerated death toll numbers and the photographs of
dead bodies that were taken and widely distributed by western media. According to Peter
Siani-Davies, author of The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, contrary to the
reports that death tolls reached as high as 12,000, which was the figure reported by
TANJUG (Telegraphic Agency of New Yugoslavia), the fact is that approximately 70
individuals lost their lives in Timisoara. 51 Many more Romanians lost their lives in the
standoff between the Romanian Army and the opposition movement after December 22,
but those numbers were not related to the massacre of December 17. 52 These reports,
however, were critical in mobilizing the opposition against Ceaucescu.53
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Furthermore, photographs of what were presented as victims of the massacres
were shown on televisions around the world, which also played an important role in
fueling the revolution. Of particular significance was a photograph of two dead bodies, a
mother and her child, that were claimed to be victims of the Timisoara massacre.
However, “after the revolution it was revealed that the woman had in fact perished from
alcohol poisoning on November 8, 1989, while the child, a young girl, had died on
December 9. The bodies had been excavated during the first frenzied search for those
who were missing after the massacre of December 17 and, presumably because it made a
striking picture, the baby had been placed on the woman and the image filed by Novi Sad
Television and MTV of Hungary.” 54
After the revolution ended, the extent of media’s impact on Romanian culture
became much clearer. According to Ganley, “Romanians reported that they had kept
contact with the West via networks of underground VCRs and swapped smuggled videos.
The Romanians had also stayed in touch with the world through cross-border television
from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, as well as via the radio transmissions of Voice
of America, Radio Free Europe, the BBC, and some other foreign radio stations.” 55
Despite Ceausescu’s oppressive regime, the Romanian people were able to have limited
access to ICTs which allowed them to become informed about what was going on, and
eventually enabled them to overthrow Ceausescu’s autocratic government. 56
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Poland
Out of all the countries in Eastern and Central Europe, the opposition movement
in Poland was “the most vigorous and successful [in utilizing] personal electronic media
for strictly political purposes.” 57 After the communist party outlawed the Solidarity
movement in 1981, the opposition managed to keep the movement alive for eight years
by creating and distributing video documentaries. These videos were then shown secretly
in churches and community centers throughout Poland. 58 In addition to this, the
opposition also created audio tapes which included “antigovernment songs recorded in
underground cabarets, interment camps, and prisons.” Because of this, the Solidarity
movement was able to take control of the Polish government in 1989, after winning 160
out of 161 seats in the Polish lower house and 99 out of 100 seats in the Senate. 59
East Germany
Contrary to the rest of the countries in the Soviet bloc, East Germany was the only
country whose citizens were able to receive Western radio and television broadcasts in
their native language. Most of the individuals were able to receive West German
broadcasts, which is why Germany’s General Secretary Walter Ulbricht was quoted
saying “the enemy of the people stands on the roof,” referring to the antennas that
allowed East Germans to pick up Western stations. 60 According to a German journalist,
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Dieter Buhl, “at the height of the cold War…Fighting brigades of the Communist Free
German Youth (FDJ) climbed the roofs and cut down the antennas.” 61
Kosovo
Many scholars have dubbed the conflict of Kosovo that went on 1996-2000, as the
“the first war on the Internet.” 62 According to John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, authors
of Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, both the
governments and the opposition utilized the Internet in unprecedented ways for the
purpose of organizing and spreading information (as well as disinformation):
“Hackers used it to voice their objections to both Yugoslav and NATO aggression
by disrupting service on government computers and taking over their web sites.
Individuals used it to tell their stories of fear and horror inside the conflict zone,
while activists exploited it to amplify their voices and reach a wide, international
audience. And people everywhere used it to discuss the issues and share text,
images, and video clips that were not available through other media.” 63
The fact that NATO forces understood the importance of this media is exemplified by the
fact that “while NATO targeted Serb media outlets carrying Milosevic’s propaganda, it
intentionally did not bomb Internet service providers or shut down the satellite links
bringing the Internet to Yugoslavia.” Moreover, the official stance of the U.S.
government was that access to the Internet will directly benefit the Serbian people by
providing them with the real story regarding Milosevic’s government. 64 Because of this,
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Serbians had access to Western views regarding the conflict, and also voiced their
opinions regarding the ongoing events.
Another example of how ICTs had an impact on the conflict in Kosovo is via
Radio B-92. Throughout most of the conflict, the media was controlled by the state and
only reported Serbia’s version of the news. Radio B-92, however, tried to present an
alternative view of the ongoing events. Because of this, Slobodan Milosevic repeatedly
tried to shut down this insubordinate station. “On April 2, 1999, Serbian authorities—
escorted by police—sealed up the doors to B-92’s studio. As the station went off the air,
its last words were: ‘We will never surrender.’” 65 The Serbian government then
replaced the original staff with employees who were loyal to the Milosevic regime and
began to broadcast the ‘official’ version of the news.
At the same time, however, the original staff of B-92 decided to turn to the
Internet. With help from a group in the Netherlands, they were able to set up a mirror site
called Help B92 which was hosted outside the country and could not be shut down by
Milosevic. On www.helpb92.xs4all.nl they posted emails from Yugoslavian citizens
describing the events that were taking place. 66 According to James Collings, author of
Words of Fire: Independent Journalists Who Challenge Dictators, Druglords and Other
Enemies of a Free Press:
“During the crucial period in 1999 when the Serbian government attempted to
silence any independent voice, the existence of the Internet was the single factor
that allowed certain oppositional groups in the former Yugoslavia to maintain
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[contact] with the outside world. It was an important test of the power of the
Internet in the struggle over information control.” 67
As a result, opposition’s desire to ensure that an alternative voice was heard, combined
with capabilities of the Internet, presented a real challenge to Milosevic and his regime’s
attempts to cover up the truth.
In addition to founding B-92, Veran Matic 68 also established ANEM, a network
of independent radio and television stations in Serbia, which were crucial in providing the
public with a view that was different from the government. According to Michael
McFaul, Director of the Center of Democracy Development, and Rule of Law (CDDRL)
at Stanford University these radio stations were also vital in providing:
“Critical coverage of Milosevic’s wars, his economic policies, and his
government’s violent arrests and abuses of young Otpor protestors helped to
undermine his support among the population. Immediately after the 2000
election, independent media [also] played a direct and central role in broadcasting
the news of a falsified vote, which in turn helped to bring people into the streets.
At the time, Milosevic had taken B-92 off the air, so the ANEM network, along
with Radio Index in Beograd, proved especially pivotal during this crisis.
Without these media, popular mobilization would have been much more difficult
to achieve.” 69
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Chapter 3
Georgia’s ‘Rose’ Revolution 70

“I am not with the government and I am not with the
opposition. I am with the people, and I will not take up
arms against them.” 71
Georgian Soldier
November 23, 2003
“One can confidently say that there would have been no
revolution without the media.” 72
Ghia Nodia
Georgian Social Scientist

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Georgia became an
independent country in March, 1991. Shortly after, Eduard Shevardnadze, the former
Soviet Foreign Minister who was instrumental in managing the peaceful dissolution of
the USSR, came back to his Georgian homeland in order to help restore order and
stability in a country that was in political and economic freefall. Although Shevardnadze
initially had contributed to Georgia’s development in a number of positive ways, 73 by the
late 1990s these few positive impacts were being overshadowed by the many negative
ones. “Under his leadership, Georgia had degenerated into what many viewed as a failed
state, plagued by rampant corruption, unable to provide basic services and incapable of
controlling its borders. The separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had been
70
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factually independent since 1993. Adjara, an ethnically Georgian region on the Black
Sea coast, was ruled by a defiant local boss, Aslan Abashidze, who refused to pay taxes
to the national budget and skimmed millions from customs and contraband.” 74 As a
result, by the time the 2003 presidential election came around, Shevardnadze’s legitimacy
level with the Georgian people was nearly exhausted.
What Happened?
Following the November 2, 2003 election, which most individuals acknowledged
as being rigged by Shevardnadze’s government, tens of thousands of Georgians gathered
in the capital city of Tbilisi demanding Shevardnadze’s resignation. Although initially
lacking direction, the protests nonetheless continued for more than three weeks, until
Shevardnadze resigned his presidency on November 24, 2003. The first major wave of
protests occurred on November 14, after a Georgian TV station, Rustavi 2, spent the
entire day broadcasting information about the protests and asking all Tbilisi residents to
join the demonstrators. 75 As a result, 20,000-25,000 Georgians flowed into the streets
demanding that Shevardnadze step down. “As the day went by, [however] it became
clear that Saakashvili, Burjanadze 76 , and Zhvania 77 were stuck. They had brought these
people into the streets, but they did not have a clear agreement on a goal they wanted to
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achieve with them, nor did they have a plan for what to do with the masses once the
speeches ended.” 78
Due to lack of organization in the opposition’s initiatives, some individuals
started to question their ability to actually win this fight. On November 17, however,
Saakashvili received the support that he needed, which eventually led to his victory.
“Out of nowhere, Tbilisi woke up to several thousand people from Adjaria
arriving on buses and trains and taking over the area in front of the Parliament on
Rustaveli Avenue. The Adjarian protesters blockaded Rustaveli with buses on
both sides of the square where they started the demonstration, and started a sit-in
that clearly was going to go on into the night and the next day. The protests were
being organized by the leadership of the [pro-Shevardnadze] Revival Party, who
spent much of the day addressing the crowds about the need to protect the
Constitution and stability, while the crowd cheered them on and waved Revival
flags.” 79
The majority of Tbilisi residents were furious with the havoc this group of Adjarians was
creating in their city in support of the Shevardnadze government. As a result, although
the supposed origin 80 of this event came from Shevardnadze or from his supporters, the
impact that it led to was detrimental to his government.
The third and final wave of protests began on November 22, as Shevardnadze was
addressing Georgia’s parliament. “A group of young Georgian politicians and activists
led by former justice minister Mikhail Saakashvili stormed into the first session of the
newly—and fraudulently—elected Georgian parliament. Holding aloft a single red
rose—the symbol of thousands who had taken to the streets in the days before—
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Saakashvili marched forward, shouting “Resign!” 81 Fearing for his life, Shevardnadze’s
bodyguards rushed him out of the room, at which time “Saakashvili [assumed]
Shevardnadze’s position at the podium and [drank] what remained of Shevardnadze’s
tea.” 82 This symbolic moment was broadcasted by television stations throughout Georgia
as well as the rest of the world.
That same day, Moscow dispatched Russia Foreign Minister, Sergei Ivanov, to
Georgia in order to prevent this conflict from escalating any further. According to most
sources, Ivanov convinced Shevardnadze to step down sometime during the summer of
2004. 83 However, immediately after Ivanov left on November 23, 2003, Shevardnadze
declared his resignation. During his last speech as President of Georgia, Shevardnadze
said,” I see that all this cannot simply go on. If I was forced tomorrow to use my
authority it would lead to a lot of bloodshed. I have never betrayed my country and so it
is better that the president resigns.” 84 In response to this, Mikhail Saakashvili, a 35-yearold leader of Georgia’s National Movement, said “the president has accomplished a
courageous act…By his resignation, he avoided spilling blood in the country…History
will judge him kindly.” 85
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Although this was the official version of the conclusion to Shevardnadze’s
presidency, the decision was really made for Shevardnadze on November 22, when the
opposition stormed the parliament building during one of his speeches.
“In the hours that followed, Mr. Shevardnadze proclaimed a state of emergency
and handed new powers to the Defense Ministry. He warned that he might use
force to restore order if the opposition didn’t leave parliament, but it was already
clear the police and the army would no longer obey him…In the hours before his
resignation, one army unit after another proclaimed its loyalty to the opposition,
and said it would ignore orders to fire on demonstrators.” 86
This is particularly doubtful considering Shevardnadze’s threats earlier in the day, and
the rumors that circulated regarding the government’s intention to use tanks in order to
stop the protests. The reality is that the military and the security forces no longer took
orders from Shevardnadze, and many of them abandoned their guns in protest, or decided
to join the demonstrators. 87 In the words of a soldier present at the protests, “Nobody can
go against their own people. We serve the Georgian people. We are the Georgian
people.” 88
Why it Happened?
Similar to many previous revolutions and those that have happened in the former
USSR since 2003, corruption was one of the main reasons driving the Georgian citizens
to protest. In the words of a Georgian consultant working for a Western donor
organization, “only two things are sustainable here in Georgia—corruption and
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Shevardnadze.” 89 In addition to this, the Georgian people also felt that Shevardnadze had
abandoned them and that he did not care about their welfare. According to one of the
protesters, “He left us out in the cold to freeze and starve. Now he is gone.” Another
protester said “We fought and died for this country and look at us now. We can barely
afford a set of clothes to stand up in.” 90
Another reason why the ‘Rose Revolution’ was able to take place was because of
Shevardnadze’s government underestimating the opposition movement. According to
Peter Mamradze, Eduard Shevardnadze’s chief-of-staff, the president did not have an
understanding of what was really going on in Georgia.
“Any time a person is cut from reality it is always the end of their career.
President Shevardnadze taught us this himself. He declared a state of emergency
when it was clear that the troops would not move against the people. People
around him never informed him in the right way. It was difficult being in the
minority and his chief-of-staff. Sometimes he would get angry if you informed
him that something was not going to plan.” 91
The final push towards the ‘Rose Revolution,’ however, took place on November
2, 2003 after Georgia’s presidential election. According to Irakly Areshidze, co-founder
of the Georgian think tank, Partnership for Social Initiatives, and author of Democracy
and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition, “As Election Day ended, no one but
the most irresponsible members of the Shevardnadze administration even tried to claim
that the vote was fully democratic. As U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles told
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one of the Western papers a few days later, the vote was a “mess from start to finish.” 92
Voting was completely manipulated in approximately 25 percent of Georgia, including
the Black Sea region of Adjaria, Kvemo Kartli region, and Javakheti, where election
results were manipulated, and turnout numbers were completely manufactured. 93 In
addition to this, all of Georgia’s police forces “were put on special alert for Election Day,
giving them an opportunity to vote not only in their home constituencies, but at their
place of deployment. This resulted in policemen often voting more than once.” 94
Another important factor behind Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ was the
involvement of local and international NGOs, in support of a wide range of causes, most
of which opposed Shevardnadze and his administration. According to Areshidze, the
NGO community began to mobilize in anticipation of electoral fraud as early as
September 2002. A Democracy Coalition was created, which was comprised of six
different organizations including the Liberty Institute; Georgian Young Lawyers’
Association; Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development; Center for
Social Research; Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights; and Partnership for Social
Initiatives. 95 With funding that primarily came from George Soros’s 96 Open Society
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Foundation and USAID, a number of different organizations, including the major ones
listed above were able to emerge in opposition to Shevardnadze’s government. 97
According to Levan Ramishvili, member of the Liberty Institute, “the success in Georgia
is a result of the people’s commitment to democracy, but without foreign assistance I’m
not sure we would have been able to achieve what we did without bloodshed.” 98
Among the various NGOs that were active in Georgia, one of the most important
was the Kmara youth group, which was founded in 2003 by the Liberty Institute.
Initially the group consisted of a small number of students at Tbilisi State University, but
it gradually became larger as the opposition movement gained momentum. From the
outset, Kmara was modeled after the Serbian Otpor Movement 99 , to the extent that the
Liberty Institute even brought former members of Otpor to Georgia in order to train
Kmara leaders on anti-government activities. 100 Among others, these activities included
buying anti-Shevardnadze advertisements on Rustavi 2 television station, which
promoted revolutionary ideals. 101
It is difficult to measure the full impact that Kmara had, since it never really
developed into a movement with a large membership, and mostly consisted of members
in Tbilisi, as well as a number of regional locations. That being said, the Kmara
movement “helped create an aura that the society was revolting against an authoritarian
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government that was limiting civil space and liberties in the country, even though this
really was not the case. In particular, Kmara constantly plastered the city with posters
derogating Shevardnadze and his allies, or simply posters saying “Kmara,” Georgian for
‘enough.’” 102
ICT in Georgia
Despite Shevardnadze’s many failures, he did allow for development and growth
of independent media in Georgia. This, however, proved to be detrimental to him in the
end, since independent media was a key factor in fueling the ‘Rose Revolution.’ This
was particularly the case in the period immediately before the election, as well as
throughout the protests. Furthermore, according to Irakly Areshidze, “it was the
existence of three dominant private television channels [Rustavi 2, Imedi, and Mze] (one
of which openly supported the revolution while the other two were more neutral, but
nonetheless anti-Shevardnadze in their coverage) that made November’s events possible,
by allowing Saakashvili and others to speak directly to the people and mobilize the
crowds against the Shevardnadze government.” 103
According to Michael McFaul, the independent television channel Rustavi 2 had
the most negative impact on Shevardadze. “Two programs on Rustavi 2—60 Minutes (a
show exposing corruption modeled after the CBS program in the United States) and
Dardubala, a satirical animated cartoon—were the most popular and the most
damaging.” 104 In addition to this, Rustavi 2 also played a key role immediately following
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the election by broadcasting their exit poll data 105 , which was significantly different from
the official results released by Georgia’s government. 106
In Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution, Jonathan Wheatley
writes that “it is quite clear that if Rustavi-2 had not existed, the ‘Rose Revolution’ would
never have happened. By giving airtime to members of opposition parties, this channel—
the most popular TV channel in Tbilisi—acquainted the population directly with their
message.” 107 This was particularly useful after the opposition “set up a stage and a giantscreen television in front of Parliament to broadcast Rustavi 2 to the crowd.” 108 In
addition to this, Rustavi-2 also “announced when and where opposition demonstration
would take place, showed a series of highly effective anti-government advertisements by
Kmara and twice aired Steve York’s award-winning film “Bringing Down a Dictator” on
OTPOR’s role in the overthrow of Milosevic.” 109
Because of very limited availability, the Internet did not play a very important
role during the ‘Rose Revolution.’ According to The 2004 CIA World Factbook, (see
Figure 1) Georgia only had 73,500 internet users in 2002, which is less then 2 percent of
the country, when taking into account Georgia’s population of 4.7 million. The same can
be said for mobile telephones, which were only available to approximately 10 percent of
Georgians in 2003.
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Did it Matter?
On November 22, 2003, Eduard Shevardnadze made a declaration that he was
introducing a state of emergency in Georgia and that all opposition members would be
met by force if necessary. The following day, however, Shevardnadze made an
announcement that he was resigning his position as president effective immediately, and
that he was going ‘home’. At this moment, the ‘Rose Revolution,’ everything that it
stood for, and everyone that supported it, became victorious. Thousands of Georgians
left their homes to join the protesters “on the streets of the capital city Tbilisi, where they
danced, sang and cheered.” 110 A young couple who brought their 25-day-old baby girl,
Ana, with them to the protests, summarized the sentiment of the moment best. “We
wanted her to be here,” they said. “Now, thank God, she will not have to lead the
miserable life we have led.” 111
Following Shevardnadze’s resignation, Nina Burdzhanadze, the speaker of
Georgia’s parliament was declared acting president, with new elections scheduled to be
held within 45 days. 112 Shortly after, Mikhail Saakashvili, “became Europe’s youngest
president with a staggering 96 percent of the popular vote.” 113 During his first year as
president, Saakashvili was able to get rid of the corrupt leader of the Adjaria region, and
re-claimed the city of Batumi. 114 He also tripled the country’s budget by raising taxes
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and recovering stolen funds, and he prosecuted a number of high-ranking officials for
taking bribes. 115 However, more than five years later, much still needs to be done.
Instead of turning to a path of freedom and democracy, Georgia has taken a
number of steps in the opposite direction since Saakashvili became president.
Immediately after winning the presidential election,
“Saakashvili realized that given the weakness of the Georgian state, keeping the
power he had gained was much more difficult than bringing down
Shevardnadze…Thus, the new leader’s first task was to consolidate his grasp of
the state, while strengthening its control over various political and economic
elements of society (other branches of government, the business community, the
Orthodox Church, the media, etc.)” 116
As a result, in February 2004, Saakashvili initiated a number of constitutional and
political changes that led to the more autocratic regime that we see in Georgia today. 117
It is difficult to measure how much success the ‘Rose Revolution’ had in Georgia.
Democracy, the way it is understood in the West, still has not taken root, and in many
ways the country has actually taken a number of steps backwards since 2003. The
conflict with Russia has intensified, and many of Saakashvili’s promises to the Georgian
people have yet to materialize. Despite this, Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ is an
inspiration to individuals who hope to bring change in their countries, and a warning to
many leaders who abuse their powers.
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Chapter 4
Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution 118 ’

“The authorities will never allow an aggressive minority
to dictate political logic. We all know that revolutions are planned
by dreamers and carried out by fanatics. And it is scoundrels
who reap the benefits. There will be no revolutions.”
Ukraine’s President Leonid Kuchma
Before the ‘Orange Revolution’ 119
What Happened?
After failing to establish a winner during presidential elections held the previous
month, on November 21, 2004, Ukrainians across the country participated in the second
round voting in an attempt to elect the country’s president. On that day, “it became clear
that President Leonid Kuchma’s incumbent regime had crudely rigged the elections to the
advantage of its candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.” 120 Approximately
85,000 polling officials ensured that nearly 3 million ‘extra’ votes were cast for
Yanukovych, which resulted in more than two weeks of protests by the opposition.
According to Anders Aslund, senior fellow at the Institute for International
Economics, and adjunct professor at Georgetown University, Ukrainians from around the
country were called to gather at ‘Maidan Square’ in the center of Kiev, in order to protest
the rigged election results. Although much of the media in Ukraine was controlled by the
118
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government, TV Channel 5, which was owned by Petro Poroshenko, made sure that their
viewers were aware of what was going on. 121 “Others stayed connected via the Internet,
notably the Web newspaper Ukrainska Pravda (Ukraine’s Truth), and also kept in touch
on mobile phones. In the freezing morning hours of November 22, thousands gathered at
Maidan. Their numbers grew and grew until they finally reached roughly one
million.” 122 The protesters made it clear that they were against the state-picked Victor
Yanukovych, and instead supported the pro-democratic, transparent candidate
represented by Victor Yuschenko. Because of this, Ukrainian officials were forced to
have another round of balloting, during which Yuschenko rightly won the Ukrainian
presidency. 123
One of the most significant actors during the Orange Revolution was the
opposition youth movement, Pora, Ukrainian for ‘It’s Time’. The group consisted of two
separate factions, the ‘yellow’ and the ‘black’ Pora, although it has not been established
which started first. According to Nadia Diuk, Black Pora borrowed many of their
techniques from the Serbian youth group Otpor, which practiced civil disobedience
against the Milosevic regime. 124 In addition to this, the group also learned from
Georgia’s Kmara movement, which helped overthrow Shevardnadze in 2003. “The
121
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leadership of Yellow Pora came out of the Freedom of Choice 125 coalition and tended to
see the role of its group as an organizer of youth and trainer of activists to ensure the
integrity of the electoral process.” 126 Although these differences between the two groups
are fairly significant, they did not come to the front during the Orange Revolution as both
groups protested side by side. In “Pora—‘It’s Time’ For Democracy in Ukraine”, Pavol
Demes and Joerg Forbrig writes:
“The central elements of voter information and social mobilization [before and
during the Orange Revolution] were Pora’s responsibility. The basic idea behind
Pora’s campaign was that the absence of independent media was far-reaching and
greatly assisted the incumbent regime in manipulating the public in the electoral
process. Alternative mass media and sources of information were needed to
guarantee free and fair elections and to give the Ukrainian public more accurate
information about the electoral process, the contenders running for the presidency,
the rights of citizens, the importance of voting, and possible state manipulation of
the election. Alternative sources of information would be instrumental in
mobilizing public protest against election fraud.” 127
According to Joshua Goldstein, writing for The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at
Harvard University:
“By September 2004, Pora had created a series of stable political networks
throughout the country, including 150 mobile groups responsible for spreading
information and coordinating election monitoring, with 72 regional centers and
over 30,000 registered participants. Mobile phones played an important role for
this mobile fleet of activists. Pora’s post-election report states, ‘a system of
immediate dissemination of information by SMS was put in place and proved to
be important.” 128
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Furthermore, Pora’s leaders established a website at www.pora.org.ua that provided
members with a single source of information, communication, and an ability to better
coordinate their activities. 129
Why It Happened?
Although most individuals point to government corruption and rigged presidential
elections, as the underlying factors that set off the ‘Orange Revolution’, in some ways the
origins of the Orange Revolution lie even deeper than that:
“In 2000, tired of unemployment and censorship, Heorhiy Gongadze, an
independent journalist, launched the online newspaper Ukrainska Pravda and
began sharply criticizing the government. Gongadze was last seen alive on
September 16, 2000. His partially decayed and decapitated body was found two
months later in a shallow grave seventy-five miles from Kiev…On November 28,
2000, Oleksandr Moroz, the leader of the Socialist Party, delivered a speech in the
Ukrainian parliament in which he accused President Kuchma of being involved in
Gongadze’s disappearance. Moroz presented audiotapes as evidence, they had
been recorded in the presidential office by one of Kuchma’s former bodyguards.
The tapes made clear that Kuchma was irritated with Gongadze and asked his
middlemen to get rid of him.” 130
This was a key moment in the development of a revolutionary state of mind for many
Ukrainians. The clear murder request by President Kuchma caused many individuals to
rise up and start the “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement. Moreover, many Ukrainians
were fed up with the lack of independent media in their country despite more than 50
official television and 400 radio broadcast stations that were present in Ukraine even
before 2000 (see Figure 2).
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Furthermore, it is commonly agreed that the U.S. was involved in Ukraine’s 2004
presidential elections. However, no consensus has been reached in regard to the degree
of involvement by the U.S. According to Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, “in
2004, several famous U.S. political and social leaders (Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, George H.W. Bush, Richard Holbrooke, George Soros, Wesley Clark,
Richard Armitage, and others) visited Ukraine with only one mission: to prevent
Kuchma and his entourage from adopting an authoritarian, illegitimate solution to the
probable political crisis.” Furthermore, the U.S. government was also not hesitant to use
a more direct and stern tone with addressing Ukrainian leadership. In a letter to President
Kuchma, George W. Bush wrote that “a tarnished election will lead us to review our
relation with Ukraine.” 131
In addition to the abovementioned diplomatic approaches, however, there are
many individuals who claim that the United States was also involved in more subversive
activities. Even Victor Yanukovych’s wife, Lyudmilla, made claims indicating that the
Orange revolution was being fueled by the CIA. 132 In an article written by Mustafa
Nayem for Ukrainska Pravda, he provides very detailed information regarding
involvement of American political technologists Philip Griffin and Paul Manafort in
Ukraine’s 2006 parliamentary elections. According to Nayem, “Mr. Manafort and his
partners gained popularity after their active participation in political campaigns in Third
World countries in the first half of 1980s. The companies and the specialists that now
131
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work with Victor Yanukovych previously consulted the governments of Kenya, Somali,
Angola (UNITA movement headed by Jonas Savimbi), Nigeria and Congo.” 133
Furthermore, Mustafa Nayem tells us that “Paul Manafort started his career in the team of
America’s 38th President, the Republican Gerald Ford, [and that] after 1974, Mr.
Manafort’s name could be found among the staff of almost all forthcoming Republican
presidents, including Ronald Reagan (1980, 1984) and George Bush Sr. (1988).” 134
Although Manaford and Griffin’s connection to the 2004 election has not been
established, the strategies that were implemented under their direction in 2006 are very
close to those implemented in 2004. Particularly interesting is the use of ‘VIP-activists,’
a small number of individuals that functioned as the backbone of both campaigns. 135
“Once a week each VIP-spokesperson received a list of speaking points which
they were obliged to deliver in their appearances. These directives were
distributed on ordinary A4 sheets of paper, without a date or an author’s name.
They were simple three to five propositions that had been developed by senior
party leadership in close cooperation with the Americans. These propositions, or
‘messages’ as they were called [using the English term], were issued on a definite
and very carefully determined schedule, and during these intervals it was
necessary to ‘toss them to the masses.’” 136
ICT in Ukraine
When compared with previous ‘color revolutions’ Ukraine’s opposition
movement did not have access to the same types of ICTs as movements in Yugoslavia,
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Georgia and other places. “There was nothing akin to B-92, the ANEM network, or
Rustavi 2 in Ukraine.” 137 The Ukrainian protesters did have one advantage over the rest
of the movements, however—more widespread availability of the Internet and cellular
telephone technology. According to The 2005 CIA World Factbook (see Figure 2), 3.8
million Ukrainians were using the Internet in 2004. Although that only amounts to 8
percent of the country’s entire population of 47.4 million, many scholars agree that the
Internet and cellular telephones played a central role during Ukraine’s revolution.
According to Michael McFaul, Director of the Center of Democracy Development, and
Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University, “the Orange Revolution may have been
the first in history to be organized largely online.” 138 During the organizational stage and
throughout the actual protests, individuals and organizations utilized a number of key
technologies that were not previously used for such purposes. SMS text messaging,
online discussion boards, as well as other forms of online media provided a forum for
activists to “share best practices and make detailed reports of election fraud.” 139
According to Ukrainska Pravda editor Olena Prytula, the Internet was central in
organizing demonstrations during the Orange Revolution:
“With strict censorship of television, the Internet was the only medium through
which one could find answers to basic questions: What is the date and location of
the next meeting? What are the plans of the opposition? What is happening in
the street? Sometimes events unfolded so rapidly that only Internet media
provided people with up-to-date information.” 140
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Furthermore, contrary to the government-supported candidate, Yanukovych,
“Yushchenko and his allies made active use of the Internet. Yushchenko’s site was
updated to the level of the best Ukrainian news sites. It was a reliable, stable source of
fresh information. The Yushchenko bloc had a site at www.razom.org.ua, and
Yushchenko had a personal site at www.yushchenko.com.ua .” 141 According to Taras
Kuzio, “The authorities had never appreciated the power of the Internet and had never
been able to compete in Internet publications.” 142 So while the authorities were fairly
confident that the media they controlled was the main source of information for
Ukrainians, the Internet provided individuals with an alternative source of information
not controlled by the government. According to Prytula, Internet use during the Orange
revolution was very similar to the samizdat phenomenon in the Soviet Union. “Internet
sites became a platform for those journalists who could not publish their materials where
they worked because of censorship. People printed online articles and took them to their
relatives, friends, and even to the rural regions where their parents lived. These articles
were republished in regional presses, penetrating to even the most remote corners of
Ukraine, where the Internet is still a novelty.” 143
Although information regarding who actually owned Ukrainian television stations
was considered private, it was something that was often discussed in Ukrainian society.
As a result, it was common knowledge that all but one of the major television stations in
Ukraine were either politically or financially connected to the Kuchma regime. 144 This
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was particularly important because for the first time since Ukraine became a sovereign
nation in 1991, an independent television station was reporting news that was not
influenced by the central government. As a result, although the station had a limited
range and was only available to approximately 30% of Ukraine’s population, 145 its
impact on exposing government corruption, and eventual promotion of social activism,
was crucial during the Orange Revolution. The opposition movement was also able to
take advantage of technological improvements in the actual television sets. According to
Taras Kuzio “Large television screens were used on the Maidan to broadcast to large
crowds what was being said by speakers on stage, as well as important news from
Channel 5.” 146
During one of Yanukovych’s visits to the city of Ivano-Frankivsk, he was hit by
an egg thrown at him by a Ukrainian student. After taking a look at the egg, Yanukovych
fell over, and was later transferred to a hospital after claiming that he was hit by a brick.
This would not have been a big deal, except that the event, recorded by various television
stations and later broadcasted by Channel 5, clearly showed that Yanukovych was in fact
hit with an egg. According to Taras Kuzio, this poor attempt to draw the publicity away
from the poisoning of his opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, ended up backfiring on
Yanukovych as Internet sites throughout the world began to mock him, and an increasing
number of ‘egg jokes’ began to circulate around Ukraine. 147
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According to The 2005 CIA World Factbook, Ukraine had an estimated 4.2
million cellular phone users in 2002 (see Figure 2), a number that continued to grow at a
staggering rate until it reached more than 55 million subscriptions in 2007. 148 Also,
while the older generation mainly utilized their cellular telephones for voice
communication, “young people were experts with cell phones, which were extensively
used. Some cell phones also have video cameras, which were used by students to video
unsuspecting professors illegally agitating for Yanukovych during class.” 149
Radio played the least influential role during the 2004 protests. “Long before the
elections, the authorities did their best to block radio channels from providing
independent views. They had considerable success.” 150 Early in 2004, the federal
government banned Radio Liberty (RL) from being able to broadcast on FM frequencies.
When RL began to broadcast from a different radio station, they were also shut down
under licensing issues. Other media companies were accused of bogus crimes such as
distribution of pornography, money laundering, and failure to ‘properly license’ their
organizations. The end result of all of this is that by the end of 2004, there were no truly
independent radio stations broadcasting in Ukraine. Most of them were either shut down,
or were forced to move their programs to the Internet, where they were able to continue
broadcasting to a very small number of listeners. 151
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Did it Matter?
Even though from a technological standpoint Ukraine was far behind many
developed nations, the small number of individuals that did have access to various
Information Communication Technologies were able to utilize them in a way that helped
create and maintain a revolutionary movement. Armed with technologies that allowed
them to have easier access to information, Ukrainian citizens were not as easily
manipulated, as before. 152
Nearly five years later, some of the accomplishments of the Orange Revolution
are clear. “Ukraine has become a real democracy with free and lively media, and its
foreign policy has become more western-oriented.” 153 In addition to this, the Orange
Revolution, exposed government corruption, allowed the rightful candidate to be elected
as President of Ukraine, and enabled ordinary Ukrainians to see that they are able to
impact the development of their country and are not just powerless subjects of an
authoritarian state. That being said, Ukraine still has a long way to go, which is
evidenced by the current political and economic issues facing the country.
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Chapter 5
The Tulip Revolution 154

“Lemon is our symbol. We have chosen the lemon color.
We are against a party of the orange.
We are against the export of revolutions from abroad.
We want to build our house on our own.
We want to live in a sovereign and independent state.” 155
Leader of the KelKel
Youth Civil Movement
January 18, 2005
“Revolutions do not occur until people learn that there is an
alternative to their way of life” 156
British Economist Barbara Ward

During his visit to the United States in spring of 1993, Kyrgyz President Askar
Akaev had a meeting with President Bill Clinton, who pointed to Akaev as an example of
a leader who supported democratic reforms and successful economic growth. Nearly
twelve years later in spring of 2005, President Akaev dissolved his government and fled
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from Kyrgyzstan as protesters around the country celebrated the end of an oppressive,
corrupt and economically devastating regime. 157
What Happened?
Contrary to the previous ‘color/flower’ revolutions, Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip
Revolution’ did not involve as much preparation by the opposition movement. The
opposition leaders were not yet unified and there were no set goals established for the
movement. To an extent, the quick outcome of the revolution even came as a surprise to
many individuals in Kyrgyzstan and abroad, as most opposition groups were only
beginning to organize for the ‘Tulip Revolution.’ According to Zamira Sydykova, editor
of Kyrgyz publication Res Publica and opposition activist, when president Akaev fled the
country on March 24, 2005, “The opposition only intended to start protest actions, so that
the authorities would annul the elections. But they did not plan the storming of the
government house.” 158 She then goes on to state one of the possible motives behind this
action was that Akaev was attempting to spark a civil war in Kyrgyzstan. “Akaev had at
first planned provocations and clashes among the participants of demonstrations, and then
deserted his office and abandoned his nation in the hope that after him a civil war would
break out.” 159
In a way, Akaev’s departure was very different from that of leaders in the
previous revolutions. While most of the leaders fought off the opposition until they
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realized that there was nothing else they could do, Akaev deserted his position and left
the country as the opposition was only beginning to mobilize. In addition to this, unlike
the previous protests, Kyrgyzstan’s revolution did not start in the capital of the country.
Protests against the government started in the south of Kyrgyzstan in the city of Osh, and
later spread to Jalalabad, where the demonstrators “eventually seized government offices,
creating a tense situation in which two ‘governments’ claimed authority over two
separate regions of the country.” 160 After the success that the opposition experienced in
the south, the protesters spread to the capital city of Bishkek.
Another difference between revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and the Tulip
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, is that the latter mostly consisted of public disorder, including
vandalism and looting. According to a Newsweek article by Frank Brown where he
describes the events of March 24, 2005:
“Looters sacked first the Narodny chain of supermarkets owned by the Akayev
clan and then scores of other stores. The poorly equipped police, frightened and
leaderless, were nowhere to be seen as gangs of young men, many of them drunk,
carried shopping bags full of beer and laundry detergent home. By daybreak,
three people were dead, more than 100 injured and the city a shambles.” 161
On the other hand, that is not to say that there was no organized protesting in
Kyrgyzstan. In January, 2005, the KelKel youth movement was founded in order to
promote peaceful opposition against the Kyrgyz government and to support free and fair
elections in Kyrgyzstan. KelKel, which means ‘renaissance,’ was modeled after the
earlier youth movements such as Otpor, Kmara, and Pora. 162 However, although the
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group was founded in January, their first official protest against Akaev’s government did
not take place until March 23, 2005, the day before president Akaev officially fled the
country. Moreover, the abovementioned protests only involved about 1,000 people in
Bishkek, and resulted in an immediate backlash from the government as security forces
were dispatched to stop the protests. In the end, “more than 20 students and journalists
were hospitalized and 200 people were arrested.” 163
In addition to this, thousands of Kyrgyz expatriates around the world began to
gather in front of Kyrgyz embassies in order to protest Akaev’s regime. According to
Erica Marat, research Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road
Studies Program, protesters gathered “in front of Kyrgyz embassies and consulates in
Washington, DC, Chicago, New York, Brussels, London and Moscow,” on March 21,
2005. 164 As a result, on March 25, 2005 the Kyrgyz parliament assembled in order to
name Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the leader of the opposition, as interim Prime Minister and
acting President of Kyrgyzstan. This transfer of power was recognized as legitimate by
the Kyrgyz courts, and the new presidential elections were scheduled for June 26, 2005.
On April 3, 2005, President Askar Akaev formally resigned as president of Kyrgyzstan.
Why it Happened?
Similarly to the 2003 revolution in Georgia and 2004 revolution in Ukraine, the
2005 revolution in Kyrgyzstan was triggered by flawed elections and general corruption
in government. According to Daniel Kimmage, editor of the Central Asia Report and
analyst for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, there was a general perception in
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Kyrgyzstan that Akaev’s family and the government were extremely corrupt and that the
ruling elite did everything in their power to maintain economic inequality. 165 The
‘Family’ controlled many of the most profitable businesses in Kyrgyzstan as well as
every branch of the government, including the judiciary.
Furthermore, according to Zamira Sadykovo, “President Akaev lost his
constitutional right to remain at his post as far back as in 2000. However, the octopus of
corruption, which his whole family has been caught by, forced him in violation of the
constitution to prolong his powers.” She then goes on to say that “I personally feel that
this phenomenon was the result of deep poverty into which the corrupted power of Akaev
has plunged the major part of the population.” 166 As a result, the revolution that followed
after the 2005 elections did not come as a surprise to Kyrgyz people, and to most
individuals following the events in Kyrgyzstan.
The final blow to the Kyrgyz people, however, came during the parliamentary
elections in 2003, when President Akaev did everything in his power in order to ensure
that his 32-year-old daughter Bermet Akaeva, 28-year-old son Aidar Akaev, “as well as
two of his sisters-in-law, the son of his Prime Minister and the son-in-law of his chief of
staff” won seats in the 75-seat parliament. 167 Roza Otunbaeyva, one of the opposition
leaders who happened to be running in the same constituency as Akaev’s daughter, was
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barred from running “because she had been living abroad for the past five years, first as
Ambassador to Britain then as a UN representative in Georgia.” 168
However, although the rigged elections were the final push that launched the
country into protest, the roots for dissatisfaction were much simpler. According to Yulia
Savchenko, fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, DC, and
television anchor of “No Edits” a talk show on Kyrgyz Pyramid TV:
“Allegations of vote-rigging served as the catalyst for the Kyrgyz revolution, but
it was pent-up frustration among the population over persistent poverty and
pervasive government corruption that packed the revolution with its explosive
power. Many supporters of the revolution are not necessarily interested in
democracy; they are just preoccupied simply with providing for themselves and
their families.” 169
According to U.S. Senator Sam Brownback, Chairman of the U.S. Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, President Akaev “failed to meet the expectations of
his people, who were extremely frustrated by years of official corruption and the prospect
of more of the same.” 170
In The Washington Times, Ariel Cohen, author and senior research fellow at the
Heritage Foundation, writes:
“Kyrgyzstan was the quintessence of everything wrong with post-communist
Central Asian regimes, though hardly the worst offender. The country is poor and
corrupt, with one gold mine responsible for 40 percent of hard currency earnings.
The elites are essentially Soviet, with a sprinkle of small traders and
criminals.” 171
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Because of this, on March 24, 2005, for the first time in the history of Kyrgyzstan, people
refused to idly stand by while another rigged transfer of power occurred in their
government.
While some believe that the Tulip Revolution was deliberately instigated by
foreign actors, similar to the previous color revolutions, quite a bit of evidence paints a
different story. According to Zamira Sadykova, the Kyrgyz people saw the revolutions
happening in Georgia and Ukraine and they wanted the same type of change to happen in
their country. 172 Furthermore, according to an interview with a KelKel leader in January,
2005:
“Lemon is our symbol. We have chosen the lemon color. We are against a party
of the orange. We are against the export of revolutions from abroad. We want to
build our house on our own. We want to live in a sovereign and independent
state.” 173
As a result, while some foreign intervention, mainly in form of financial assistance, was
certainly a factor during the Tulip Revolution, the people of Kyrgyzstan were the driving
force in this revolution.
One of the ways in which the U.S. government was involved in Kyrgyzstan was
through Freedom House, a pro-democracy organization that receives some of its funding
from the U.S. government. In 2005, Freedom House “set up Kyrgyzstan’s only
independent printing plant, publishing the opposition newspapers that fuelled popular
discontent in the weeks prior to the Tulip Revolution.” 174 In his interview with Mike
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Stone, the Kyrgyzstan project director for Freedom House, Mr. Stone describes some of
the activities that he was involved in, including assisting media development and printing
newspapers, like the opposition publication MSN (My Capital News). According to Mr.
Stone, none of these activities were directed at creating a revolution. Furthermore,
“Brian Kemple, a lawyer who runs a project working with the Kyrgyz government
reforming the legal system for USAID, said internal dissatisfaction with a corrupt regime
was what motivated the protests.” 175 That being said, U.S. funded programs definitely
enabled more Kyrgyzstanis to become aware of what was going on in their country, and
provided them with new methods of being able to voice their dissatisfaction.
ICT in Kyrgyzstan
Although there were only 263,000 Internet users in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (See
Figure 3) the Internet played a significant role before and during the Tulip Revolution.
The opposition movement had a number of websites, including www.gazeta.kg,
www.kyrgyz.us, and www.msn.kg, which published articles by opposition leaders,
supplied information regarding opposition activities, and provided a forum where
opposition members could communicate with each other. Opposition groups also created
sites like www.Akaevu.net (No to Akaev in Russian), which did not represent a specific
political group, but instead served as a rallying point for anyone dissatisfied with
President Akaev. In addition to this, email was used for communication purposes, which
allowed the dissidents to get their message out much quicker. 176
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It is clear that the Kyrgyz government also understood the Internet’s potential.
On more than one occasion, various groups connected with the authorities attempted to
hinder opposition efforts on the Web. The first attempt occurred in January, and
consisted of a ‘black PR’ e-mail campaign. “Messages aimed at discrediting the
opposition [were] being sent from “spoofed,” or falsified, e-mail addresses supposedly
belonging to legitimate independent Internet domains such as Gazeta.kg and
CentrAsia.ru.” 177 According to Claire Wilkinson of Birmingham University in UK,
“many of the messages launched personal attacks on opposition leaders, especially
Otunbaeva and Kurmanbek Bakiev, who were variously portrayed as Western-funded
agents, self-interested money-grabbers, printers of counterfeit money, and communist-era
politicians intent on deceiving people for their own gain.” 178
The second ICT attack by the government was much more direct, in that it
actually involved attempts to limit the access to the Internet. Attacks were carried out
“on major internet service providers such as Elcat and AsiInfo to block access, as well as
flooding e-mail accounts with spam. The result of these ‘denial of service’ attacks was to
make many sites, regardless of affiliation or ownership, inaccessible for a period of
several weeks both inside the republic and abroad, further curtailing already limited
coverage of events in Kyrgyzstan.” 179 Among the websites that were impacted by this
attack were www.gazeta.kg and www.kyrgyz.us, and www.msn.kg. 180
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The opposition group KelKel also had a website at www.KelKel.kg which was
launched in February, 2005. However, shortly after launching the website, the
government used this Internet domain to host a ‘clone’ website that promoted progovernment views. According to Wilkinson, this website contained messages such as:
“We are for stability in the country and do not want young people to be used as
‘pioneers’ for an imported revolution or for personal interests. We think that young
people should get on with their own business, and that they are more suited to studying
and going on dates.” and “Down with demonstrations! Down with the revolution!” 181
While only five percent of Kyrgyzstan’s population had access to the Internet,
nearly everyone was able to listen to the radio. Radio Azzatyk, which was a Kyrgyzlanguage branch of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that was financed by the United
States, was the only independent radio station in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Among other
activities, Radio Azzatyk aired summaries of opposition newspapers on its airwaves in
order to reach a broader audience in a more cost-effective way. 182 The government,
however, was adamant in preventing Radio Azzatyk from broadcasting in Kyrgyzstan
and attempted to shut it down on numerous occasions. One of these attempts took place
on February 24, three days before the parliamentary elections, “after RMTR, the
technical service of the state distributor Kyrgyztelecom, decided to abruptly interrupt
broadcasts of Radio Azattyk, on the pretext of holding a first auction of short and
medium waves.” 183
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One of the largest independent television stations, Pyramida, was also key in
fostering the revolutionary movement. It had a number of controversial shows, including
a weekly political show, Nashe Vremya (‘Our Time’ in Russian) which criticized the
government. In addition to this, it also provided airtime to various opposition leaders,
which no government-influenced television station was willing to do. 184 The only other
independent television station in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 was Osh TV, which broadcasted to
a limited area in the south of Kyrgyzstan, where the protests that led to Mr. Akaev’s
ouster began. Osh TV expanded its reach with equipment paid for by the State
Department.” 185 Like Pyramid TV, Osh TV also carried the U.S.-supported Nashe
Vremya Talk Show, which contributed towards raising awareness of government
corruption in Kyrgyzstan.
One of the most effective tools of the opposition, however, was the Media
Support Center publishing house. Funded by Freedom House, MSC was the only
independent printing press, and it was the source of every major opposition publication in
Kyrgyzstan. These included Respublica, Analitika, Litsa and Moya Stolitsa Novosti
(MSN – My Capital News in Russian). “MSN informed people in the north of the unrest
in the south. The newspaper also played a critical role in disseminating word of when
and where protesters should gather.” 186 The contribution of the abovementioned
publication to damaging the image of Akaev and his regime can be seen from the fact that
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the government attempted to shut down the publication on several occasions. 187 The
most obvious of these attempts was when the state utility company, Severelektro
demanded that the power to the printing facility be cut off from February 22-26.
Fortunately, however, MSC was able to find an electricity generator which allowed it to
continue printing its publications. 188
Did it Matter?
According to Dr. Martha Olcott, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International peace, “The mass protest in Kyrgyzstan against Kyrgyzstan’s flawed
parliamentary elections that led to the ouster of President Akaev were as momentous in
their own way as the Rose or Orange revolutions.” The Tulip Revolution made it clear
that people living in Central Asian countries also expect their rights as citizens to be
protected, and that their governments are responsive to the needs of the people. 189 The
protests also “demonstrated that long-term U.S. and OSCE investments in projects
designed to build citizen participation at the grassroots level are worthwhile, that the
presence of a deeply rooted nongovernmental organizations, once they reach a critical
number, can play a decisive role in political struggles by serving as the instrument to
challenging public protests in peaceful ways.” 190
In addition to this, the Tulip Revolution also had an impact on the other Central
Asian countries, as well as on other oppressive regimes in the former Soviet Union.
187

Spencer, “Quiet American.”

188

Reporters without Borders for Press Freedom, “Authorities Harass.”

189

Olcott, Martha, “Kyrgyzstan’s Revolution: Causes and Consequences,” Hearing Before the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 109th Congress, 1st Session, April 7, 2005,
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 7.

190

Olcott, “Kyrgyzstan’s Revolution,” 7.

59

During the same time that the protests were unfolding in Kyrgyzstan, over 1,000
individuals gathered on the streets of Minsk, Belarus, in hopes of igniting similar change
in their countries. Meanwhile, leaders in the neighboring countries began to close their
borders and further oppress the opposition movements in their countries.
A few weeks after President Akaev fled from Kyrgyzstan, Zamira Sadykova,
editor of Kyrgyz publication Res Publica and opposition activist, made the following
statement in a hearing before U.S. Congress: “It’s definite that Kyrgyzstan will now
support civil society, freedom of mass media, transparency of state government.” 191 That
being said, more than four years later, many of the promises made by the opposition
leaders in 2005, have yet to materialize. In addition to this, President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev has made a number of changes that have actually had a detrimental effect to
Kyrgyzstan’s level of freedom and democracy.
According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty article written on the four-year
anniversary of the Tulip Revolution, the current level of media freedom in Kyrgyzstan is
lower than it has been in years. Contrary to Bakiev’s promises that he would make all
media independent, most media in Kyrgyzstan is controlled by the government. 192 A
year and a half after Bakiev’s election, however, there was only one independent TV
channel (Pyramid TV) in Kyrgystan, out of a total of 47 stations. In addition to this,
many individuals say that what Bakiev basically did is “replaced rule by his
predecessor’s family with rule by his own. [And that] on his watch, corruption is
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believed to have become even more entrenched.” 193 According to Bekdzhan Derbishev,
of Pyramid’s founders, “One begins to remember the Akayev days as a golden age
because the people who are in power now are completely out of control.” 194
One of the reasons why the Tulip Revolution has not been very successful is
because the Kyrgyz opposition movement did not have a single leader around which they
could mobilize. Instead, there were several opposition leaders, all of whom had different
ideas of what the post-Akaev Kyrgyzstan should look like. Because of this, shortly after
Kurmanbek Bakiev assumed the presidency, most of the other opposition leaders turned
against him, and he ended up curtailing access to the vehicles which helped the
opposition when he was the one attempting to make changes. “In the first 18 months of
Bakiev’s presidency, there were near-constant demonstrations as the populace grew
dissatisfied with a perceived lack on urgency on the government’s part to fulfill promises
of reform. Calls of “Bakiev must go!” became common across cities and towns in
Kyrgyzstan.” 195
According to Social Democratic Party leader Roza Otunbaeva, who was one of
the opposition leaders in 2005, the Tulip Revolution was a victory of the Kyrgyz people,
but it was a victory that was stolen:
“We witnessed only how one clan was changed for another one. When we were
discussing whether we should celebrate this day or not, I said that the revolution
is still happening. Those people who wanted to arrest us [in 2005], who became
very rich under Akaev’s regime, they are still here [around Bakiev now]—but
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those who made this revolution are left on the streets, that’s why they are all
disappointed.” 196
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Chapter 6:
Moldova’s Twitter Revolution

“Moldovan journalists are poorly paid and frequently sell
their services to the highest bidder. Hidden advertising,
acceptance of money and gifts, recycling of stories—these
are just some of the most common journalistic offences in
Moldova.” 197
Natalia Angheli
“North of Moldova TV IS OFF!!! But we have
THE ALMIGHTY INTERNET!
Let us use it to communicate peacefully for freedom!!” 198
Twitter Message
Chisinau, 04/08/09

According to Stratfor, a world leader in global intelligence founded by George
Friedman, “between 10,000 and 30,000 protesters stormed the presidential palace and the
parliament building in Moldova’s capital, Chisinau on April 7, 2008.” 199 Most sources,
however, estimate the number of protesters to have been somewhere between 15,000 and
20,000. That number might not seem very large, but it is fairly significant when one
considers the size of Moldova. To draw a comparison between Moldova’s population of
4 million people and more than 300 million in the US, that is akin to a riot of
approximately 1-1.5 million individuals in the US. To put it another way, it is about the
same as 15-20,000 Maryland(ers) storming the White House, the House of
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Representatives, causing both to be evacuated as property was being destroyed and the
buildings set ablaze.
Contrary to previous ‘color revolutions,’ which got their names from the colors of
the flags that were used during the protests, most of the media has labeled the protests in
Moldova after the technology that was used. Moldova’s ‘Twitter Revolution’ was
initiated by a string of posts on Twitter, which is a social-networking tool commonly
used to communicate brief messages to a network of individuals, or followers, in Twitter
terms. 200 Although Europe’s poorest and least developed country, Moldova is a perfect
example of how individuals can use simple and low-cost information communication
technologies to organize protests, riots, and even generate revolutionary movements that
demand change from their governments. In a matter of hours, thousands of protesters
were mobilized by a thread of posts under the tag of #pman, which stands for Piata Marii
Adunari Nationale, the name of the city square in Chisinau, Moldova where the protests
began. 201
What Happened?
In “The Revolution Will Be Tweeted: Moldovan Protesters Exploit Social
Networking Sites,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Ron Synovitz writes that
“opposition leaders and activists in Moldova have been using text messages, blogs, and
social-networking sites like Twitter and Facebook to draw thousands of people to the
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antigovernment demonstrations.” 202 According to Alexei Ghertescu, a 27-year-old
lawyer from Chisinau, Twitter has been a key source of most current information for him.
“I just received updated information about what is going on at the square in the center of
the city, and on the [closed] border [with Romania] and from other places. So it is
actually a main source of information for me about what is going on.” 203 Furthermore,
according to RFE/RL Chisinau Bureau chief, Vasile Botnaru, electronic text messages
were key in mobilizing protesters in Moldova:
“I received at least two e-mail messages inviting me on [April 6] to ‘light a candle
for the funeral’ in the center of the city of Chisinau because of the Communist
election victory. And these e-mail messages were asking the receivers to resend
the message to all of the people they know. This is the way the information
spread out like ripples on the surface of the water. This was a test of the ability of
young people to benefit from their use of the Internet networks.”
In an interview with Evgeny Morozov, author and senior fellow at the Open
Society Institute in New York, he points out that while individuals are in fact utilizing
ICT’s to organize and challenge their governments, the authorities are also learning from
their mistakes. According to Morozov, even though
“The technology and cell phone coverage and Wi-Fi networks were [initially]
available in the central square in Chisinau, they were later turned off. And people
who were trying to post the updates on Twitter, which were their blogs, they
could not do it just because the technology was not there. So I think it reveals that
authorities are also learning their lessons, doing their homework, and essentially
learning how to manipulate the technology to stay in power.” 204
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Although direct government involvement in the mobile and internet networks has not
been confirmed, many individuals claim that the Moldovan government did in fact shut
down the mobile and internet networks in Moldova during the highest points of the
protests. According to RFE/RL’s Vasile Botnaru:
“The mobile-phone network went down in central Chisinau for about three hours
on April 7, for users who subscribe through one of the two most popular providers
in the country—the company Orange. He says there are suspicions among
demonstrators that government authorities were responsible for that outage.
Meanwhile, the owners of websites that have been inaccessible in recent days are
investigating the cause of their problems. They say they have yet to determine if
their websites were intentionally blocked by authorities with the goal of cutting
communications between protesters, or if there simply has been a network failure
because the system was overloaded by too much traffic.” 205
In addition to the ICT countermeasures by Moldovan government, more
traditional methods of controlling the protest were also utilized by the authorities.
According to the European Parliament, “acts of horrible violence” occurred in Moldova
during and after the April protests. Delegates from EU’s fact-finding mission claimed
that many arrested individuals “were brutally beaten and forced to walk through
‘corridors of death,’ two rows of police officers who beat them with their fists, feet, and
truncheons.” 206
Why It Happened?
The main reason behind the riots in Moldova’s capital was the result of the
parliamentary election that was held two days before the protests. According to most
Western sources, including Baroness Emma Nicholson, who is a member of the European
Parliament and was part of the International Election Observation Mission in Moldova
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during the elections, 207 she and others with the IEOM had a “very, very strong feeling”
that there was some sort of manipulation on behalf of the Communist party. 208
Furthermore, according to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), opinion polls before the vote gave the Communist Party about 36 percent of the
vote, which is far lower than the 50 percent that the Communists claimed to have won. 209
In addition to this, the Mayor of Chisinau, Dorin Chirtoaca, made a public statement
supporting the protesters, and stating that it was not possible for people to vote for the
Communist party in such large numbers. 210 According to Alina Martiniuc, a student who
was present at the protests:
“I went to see the protests yesterday. I got a few messages from colleagues that
there’ll be protests, but I did not know how dangerous it was going to be. There
were scuffles between students and the police. A colleague of mine was hit by a
policeman. Students were throwing stones at the building, breaking most
windows. Some of my colleagues went in and later said that they went to the 14th
floor, smashed everything and put the president’s chair and portrait on fire. The
students are discontented with the election result. Most of the people who voted
for communism are old people, but old people are dying and there are more young
people voting now than before. So the result is definitely not true. It’s not
logical.” 211
In addition to the election results, Moldovan citizens are generally weary of their
Communist government’s corrupt regime and its inability to bring the type of positive
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change to Moldova that its constituents long to see. 212 Writing during his visit to
Moldova in 2007, Chad Nagle, a US attorney and author, wrote the following:
In the small southern city of Comrat, an old woman on crutches told me her
pension was well below sustenance level and was seldom paid on time. Her
neighbor agreed, complaining loudly: “We don’t want a perfect life, only
something a little better than now.” It was difficult to imagine that conditions
could get any worse. A polling station worker in the small village of Mihailovka
told me: “People couldn’t care less about the geopolitical orientation of Moldova.
All they want is to live decently, have enough to eat, and drink the occasional
glass of wine.” 213
Moldova is officially the poorest country in Europe with an average monthly wage of less
than $250 214 , and approximately 25 percent of its population working abroad at any given
time. When combined, with the conflict in Trans-Dniester, where part of Moldova is
under Russian control, and neighboring Romania’s recent admission to the European
Union, there is much for the average Moldovan to be disappointed about. 215 According
to Liliana Calmnatui, an NGO worker who was present at the protests:
“Most of the people in Chisinau voted for the democratic parties. I’ve been
asking friends, neighbors, people on the street. Indeed in the villages, where there
are only old people left, most people would vote for the Communist Party. But
the young people of our country want a better life, they can’t be satisfied with
$150 a month. There is room for [vote] fraud. I think 10-15% is unaccounted for.
I’ve visited villages as part of my work, where 200 new names have appeared on
election lists with nobody knowing who those people are. That’s just one
example, but also, it is not clear what happens when you change address, or when
you go abroad and some of that data can be used to manipulate results.” 216
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In addition to this, many claim that that as many as 180,000 ‘dead souls’ voted for the
Communist party during the election. 217
ICT in Moldova
To get a better understanding of the significance of the protests that took place in
Chisinau, however, it is also important to discuss the level of ICT use in Moldova, where
it is most predominant, and who tends to use the various ICTs that have the capacity to
create a movement of this size. In his article, Over the Digital Divide, Alexander
Baranov defines the idea of digital inequality in a population as “deep inequality in
access to social, economic, educational, cultural and other opportunities owing to unequal
access to information and communication technologies.” 218 In Moldova, the topic of
investing into Information Communication Technology has been discussed since the
early 1990s. However, the extreme poverty of the country has not allowed the
government and businesses to invest into the development of ICTs. As a result, even
though the country has a fairly good infrastructure, it was not until 2003 that some
specific steps have been taken in the direction of developing ICT in Moldova. 219
According to the data from the Internet World Stats, Moldova had 727,700 Internet users
as of August, 2007, which is approximately 20 percent of the population. 220 This is a
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drastic increase from 2000, when Moldova had only 25,000 Internet users. 221
Furthermore, according to the most recent information published by the CIA, there were
1,883,000 cell phone subscriptions in Moldova in 2007, which is approximately half the
country’s population (see Figure 4).
During the past several years, there has also been an increased initiative on the
part of the government to promote ICT growth in the various sectors of Moldovan
society. As a result, in 2005 the Ministry of Information Development was created, and
“the government has accepted the strategy of information-society creation called
‘Electronic Moldova’ and the action plan for its implementation.” 222 This has led to a
number of important developments, including creation of an online payment system,
http://www.fincompay.com for various municipal services, and a number of other eservices which are available via websites like http://www.gov.md . Consequentially,
while there is still a large digital divide in Moldova, the gap is rapidly shrinking.
Apart from the Internet and cellular telephones, however, most of the other types
of Information Communication Technologies are not as promising. The 2009 CIA World
Factbook claims that in 2006 Moldova had 31 Radio Broadcast Stations and 40
Television Broadcast Stations. That, however, does not mean that there are many
independent voices in Moldova’s Radio and Television. According to Natalia Angheli’s
article in International Communications: A Media Literacy Approach, “Growing
numbers [of TV and radio stations] have not translated into a free and balanced media.
Excessive government control and harassment by authorities and inadequate regulating
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and self-regulating mechanisms seriously hinder the development of media in
Moldova.” 223 Furthermore, Angheli writes that “Censorship of state-owned media is
widely spread, especially after Communists came to power in February 2001. Journalists
are openly ordered what and how to write, and “disloyal” media managers are routinely
sacked. The most vivid example of this censorship is seen in the national TV channel
Moldova 1, whose newscasts are sadly reminiscent of the old Soviet “talking-head” news
about the comings and goings of the Communist elite.” 224 And since television and radio
are the predominant sources of information for most Moldovans this means that many
individuals do not get an unbiased perspective when it comes to events that impact their
lives. During the Twitter Revolution, this phenomenon was clearly articulated in a
statement by a 21-year-old economics student at the Free International University of
Moldova, Adrian Blajinski:
“I wanted to participate myself in such a protest after hearing the official elections
results because I think they have been rigged. I tried to find out more information
about the elections from Moldovan state television, but it was broadcasting only
movies and comedy programs—nothing about what is going on [with the
protests]. The other information source for me has been information news sites. I
managed to find one Internet site that had not been shut down yet—because many
of them have been shut down—and it was there that I found out about the protest
[on April 7] and that the main square was already full.” 225
Did it Matter?
What was supposed to be a smooth transition of power, as Vladimir Voronin
passed the Moldovan presidency to Prime Minister Zinaida Greceanii, turned out to be
much more complicated “after three opposition parties said they would boycott the
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contest,” and the Moldovan Parliament decided to reject Voronin’s protégé. 226
According to Valeriu Sava, head of parliament’s election commission, [Voronin’s
successor] won 60 votes—one less than the 61 needed to win in [Moldova’s] 101-seat
chamber.” 227 In effect, the opposition parties were able to ‘nullify’ the results of the
parliamentary elections that triggered the protests in Moldova. Furthermore, according to
Vladimir Socor, “failure to elect the head of state after two rounds of balloting triggers
the dissolution of parliament and new elections from scratch. This procedure is now set
in motion. 228 A new parliament, head of state, and government might be in place by
August or September, provided that a governing majority emerges from the elections.” 229
As a result, the protesters were in effect able to reverse the outcome of the elections that
they believed to be rigged, and directly impact the political direction of their country.
However, there are some individuals like writer Daniel McAdams, who believe
that the protests in Moldova were not the result of sporadic ideas set in motion by a few
young people. In an article on LewRockwell.com, McAdams writes that “while the press
lauds the “spontaneous” mass organization to overthrow Voronin, one does not have to
dust the scene of the crime too carefully to see U.S. foreign policy fingerprints all over
the place.” 230 Furthermore, McAdams provides the reader with a number of sources that
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support his argument. According to him, one of the organizations that is responsible for
leading this movement is Hyde Park Organization, which receives support from the
Internet Access Training Program (IATP), which is a program funded through the U.S.
State Department under the Freedom Support Act (FSA). 231 According to the US
government, IATP “provides local communities with free access to the Internet and to
extensive training in all aspects of information technology.” 232 Furthermore, he points to
various programs funded by USAID, such as the Strengthening Democratic Political
Activism in Moldova (SPA) Program, whose objective is to cultivate “new political
activists who can formulate and pursue concrete political objectives.” 233
Although claims like the one by Daniel McAdams might seem farfetched, he is
certainly not alone. Russian-backed leaders in Moldova, as well as political leaders in
Russia, are also pointing the blame towards the West. According to Gennadiy Zhuganov,
leader of Russia’s Communist Party, “These are provocateurs at work, using the elections
as a shield. The same people stand behind the events in Moldova, the Orange Revolution
in Ukraine, and behind [President Mikhail] Saakashvili in Georgia.” 234 Furthermore,
according to Vladimir Voronin, “When the flag of Romania was raised on state buildings,
the attempts of the opposition to carry out a coup became clear. We will not allow
this.” 235 In addition to this, according to an article published in Stratfor:
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Moldova gives the United States and Europe the opportunity to strike even closer
to the Kremlin’s heart. Russia, feeling confident about its situation with Ukraine
and Georgia, thus far has engaged in discussion on the BMD [Ballistic Missile
Defense] issue under assumptions that its actual periphery was safe from Western
encroachment. But, though there has been no evidence of U.S. involvement in
Moldova’s protests yet, Washington well might use the situation in Chisinau to
remind the Kremlin that it has many levers—in many colors—to throw Moscow
off-balance. 236
It is still early to determine what the eventual outcomes of Moldova’s Twitter
Revolution will be. At this point, there is still no consensus on the origin of this
revolution, and whether it was the outcome of six young Moldovans expressing their
frustration with their country, utilizing the most recent social networking and other ICT
technologies, or if this was a carefully executed program by the United States and other
Western powers. Was this just an expression of anger on behalf of Moldova’s citizens, or
was this in fact the latest occurrence in a long line of ‘color revolutions? If it’s the latter,
does this mean that positive change is on its way? These are questions that will not be
answered for a long time to come. What we can say, however, is that Moldova’s Twitter
Revolution is just a beginning of a much larger trend, as individuals across the globe have
the ability to create a large-scale protest, movement or even a revolution, with
unprecedented ease and quickness.
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Chapter 7
The Case of Russia
“Democracy is now on hold in Russia. Former Soviet
leader Yuri Andropov once said, “First we’ll make enough
sausages and then we won’t have any dissidents.” 237
Ian Bremmer
The J-Curve
"We've seen an epidemic of refusals to provide information
in the last four years. As soon as Putin came, they all
remembered the traditions of the Soviet era. They release
information or not on a whim, and if you say there are laws
about this, they don't care." 238
Oleg Panifilov (Media Activist)
“It doesn’t matter what color the cat is—as long as it
catches mice.”
Deng Xiaoping

Reading about Russia’s system of democracy in most Western publications one
cannot help but get the feeling that Russia is much more autocratic now than it has been
in years. The political system in Russia seems to be much closer to a Tsarist form of rule
than to democratic governance as it is understood in the West, and individual freedoms
are constantly reduced. As a result, it is difficult to feel anything other than hopelessness
for the future of Russian people and their prospects of joining the rest of the world as a
free and democratic nation. In addition to this, few Russian publications that are not
connected with the Kremlin will contest the abovementioned view, and even Russian
scholars who feel very hopeful about Russia’s future will still point out that politically,
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Russia is an autocratic regime. According to Dmitry Trenin, author of Getting Russia
Right and director of the Carnegie Moscow Center:
“There is no question that [Russia] has a tsarist political system, in which all
major decisions are taken by one institution, the presidency, also known as the
Kremlin. The separation of powers, provided for under the 1993 constitution, is a
fiction. All institutions of the federal government, from the cabinet to the
bicameral legislature, are in reality mere agents of the presidency. The legal
system is anything but independent, especially when dealing with the opponents
of the Kremlin, and the prosecutor general’s office has become a tool of choice in
the hand of the presidency. Officially known as a federation, Russia is in reality
closer to a unitary state, with the governors of the country’s seven dozen regions
appointed and dismissed by the president. 239
Despite all of this, however, Russia’s citizens do not seem to have a revolutionary state of
mind. Even though, technologically, Russia is in many ways more developed than many
countries that surround it, and most of its citizens are aware of what is going on around
them, there is not much opposition to the federal government and to the exclusive
authority that it has over Russian lives.
Freedom in Russia
When Mikhail Gorbachev made the “decision to permit partially free elections to
the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989, [this was] the first opportunity for
societal forces to try to influence politics directly. The electoral process produced an
unprecedented whirl of societal mobilization. Media criticism exploded; electoral clubs
sprouted; and noncommunist, pro-perestroika organizations convened.” 240 For the first
time in Russia’s 1,000-year history, individuals were able to experience political
freedom, and Russian people felt like they had an actual say in political decisions that
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impacted their lives. Although Tsarist Russia did provide the “state and limited arenas
[with some] autonomous social activity, especially from 1861,” 241 this autonomy was
very limited. Moreover, whatever freedoms may have been acquired by Russian people
in the late nineteenth century, were quickly taken away as communism spread across
Russia.
That being said, there were little spurts of individual freedom that did emerge
across the Soviet Union prior to 1989, particularly during Leonid Brezhnev’s rule, when
“a small number of brave, dissident individuals and groups openly challenged the Soviet
system, and informal intelligentsia groups composed of scientists, writers, and other
professionals began to challenge Stalinist taboos, communicating their views primarily
through samizdat, self published critical literature on forbidden subjects.” 242 Moreover,
there were always various religious groups that were active during the Soviet times,
which defied the government and continued to practice religious freedom. This,
however, was not done in the open and when caught, these individuals were subjected to
extreme punishments.
In 1991, the Soviet people took their newly obtained freedom to unprecedented
levels, as protests erupted across the country, leading to eventual dissolution of the USSR
in December 1991. Although the new Russian government, led by Boris Yeltsin, “did
not call for elections after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the first post-Soviet
elections did not take place until December 1993,” 243 Yeltsin did not take any of the new
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freedoms away from Russian citizens. The new constitution that passed under Yeltsin in
1993, “provided for the protection of basic civil liberties—the freedoms of speech, press,
religion, association, and peaceful assembly—without which a civil society could not
meaningfully exist.” 244
Negative Developments
When Putin came to power in the spring of 2000, however, Russia experienced a
sharp reversal, and many of the newly-acquired freedoms that Russians began to
experience following the breakup of the Soviet Union began to wither away. According
to Michael McFaul, director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law
at Stanford University, and Elina Treyger, of Harvard University, “the strategy of Putin’s
government appears to be to eliminate as many opposing actors from the political playing
field as possible and to create what some of his advisers call ‘managed democracy.’ 245
Moreover, one of the defining features of the Putin regime is an increasing climate of
fear, termed by some ‘the KGBization of the state.’ The harassment of activists,
researchers, and journalists, […] has been communicating a clear message to those
involved in independent activities.” 246
According to Ian Bremmer, author of J-Curve: A New Way to Understand Why
Nations Rise and Fall, and president of the Eurasia Group:
“When Putin took office, he reportedly called together the new business leaders
and forged an unwritten but plainly understood pact with them: the oligarchs
could keep the cash and property they had amassed in the rigged privatization
deals of the Yeltsin years without fear of prosecution, as long as they paid their
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taxes and steered clear of political conflict with the president. The latter condition
precluded use of the oligarchs’ media holdings to criticize Putin or his
administration.” 247
Although this was understood by most of the oligarchs, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir
Gusinsky were reluctant to give up the political influence that they had during the Yeltsin
administration, and continued to utilize their media companies in order to criticize the
Putin government. As a result, Kremlin security guards, armed with automatic weapons,
raided Vladimir Gusinsy’s NTV television station in April, 2001. “By sunrise, NTV was
a new television network with an editorial philosophy more in harmony with the
Kremlin’s worldview.” 248
In 2003, Putin made another political choice which further defined his presidency
as autocratic. A well known oil tycoon, Mikhail Khodorovsky, 249 was openly
contributing to several political parties that were trying to win seats in the Russian
Duma 250 during the 2003 elections. “In particular, he gave generously to the two bestknown liberal-reformist, pro-market parties, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces.” 251
A number of warnings were sent by Kremlin to Khodorovsky urging him to stop his
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political activity. When this did not happen, Putin intervened. “On October 25, 2003,
armed agents stormed [Khodorovsky’s] private plane during a refueling stop, arrested
him, and returned him to Moscow in handcuffs. [He] is now serving an eight-year prison
sentence in a Siberian penal colony.” 252 Furthermore, in a Washington Post article,
Masha Lipman, editor of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Pro et Contra journal, wrote
that following his arrest, Khodorovsky’s “thriving business was destroyed through mindboggling tax claims and legal shenanigans [by Kremlin] that ensured YUKOS paid its
“debts” to the state.” 253
The next big step that Putin made in order to further centralize political control in
Russia came in 2004, following the Chechen terrorist attack in Beslan. Putin knew that
the nation was rallied around him at this time so he made a decision to use this
opportunity. 254 Shortly after, he made a proposal that ended popular election of Russia’s
eighty-three governors 255 . “According to the plan, the president, subject to ratification by
the local legislatures, gained the right to handpick the leaders of Russia’s regions.
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…Putin also proposed an end to gubernatorial term limits. Sitting governors can now
hold their posts indefinitely; all they need is the favor of the Kremlin.” 256
That same year, Vladimir Putin also made a proposal that called for all the seats in
the Russian parliament to be filled from national party lists. This action allows elected
officials to act in a way that is not dependent on their constituencies.
“Members of Russia’s lower house now depend for their seats not on local voters
but on party leaders, an effective way for Putin to reduce the number of variables
he faces as he pushes reform, or refuses to push reform, through parliament.” 257
Furthermore, in October, 2004, the Russian Federal Assembly passed a law which gave
the Russian president power to approve the judges for all of Russia’s high courts. This
law “also gives the president the power to discipline and dismiss senior judges if, once
chosen, they demonstrate qualities the Kremlin wants to discourage.” 258
Positive Developments
At the same time that all of these negative changes have been taking place,
detrimentally affecting freedom in Russia, there have been some positive developments
that are worth noting. Being able to own private property in a way equals to freedom,
and the “degrees of freedom [are] proportional to the amount of property one owns.” 259
In today’s Russia we can clearly see that individuals across society are taking advantage
of this recently-acquired freedom. “Indeed, at the beginning of the twenty-first century
Russia, once a paradigm of collectivism, has largely gone private. Individualism is
spreading, often at the expense of solidarity. More and more people are interested in
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making a good living for themselves.” 260 Economic growth, and consequent
consumption, can be seen everywhere in Russia, and it is the focus of most Russian
citizens today.
Russians are also experiencing unprecedented religious freedom. While the
Soviet era was known for religious persecution and no freedom of worship was allowed,
today’s Russia is fairly open towards most religious expression.
“Since 1988, when the still officially communist state joined the Russian
Orthodox Church (ROC) in celebrating the millennium of Christianity in Russia,
the ROC has moved to occupy a central place in Russia’s spiritual realm. In the
same period, Muslim revival was no less conspicuous and even more vibrant.
Judaism was officially recognized as an indigenous religion, and official antiSemitism became history.” 261
Contrary to the four established religions, Russian Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism
and Buddhism, other Christian groups, including various Protestant faiths and
Catholicism, are only allowed to operate with certain restrictions. 262
In addition to being able to own property and practice certain religions, Russian
citizens are also able to travel around Russia and abroad without restrictions. Contrary to
the Soviet times, when one was not able to obtain a passport for international travel
except in very specific instances, today’s Russians are traveling in unprecedented
numbers. “In 2005, 6.5 million Russians traveled abroad, with Turkey, China, and Egypt,
all holiday destinations, topping the list.” 263
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ICT in Russia
In 1997, one typically paid around $2,200 for a basic desktop computer system in
Moscow City. Compared to the United States at around the same time, this price was
approximately 50-70 percent higher. In 2003, a basic desktop computer system
purchased in Moscow City cost around $1,000. 264 In addition to this, Russia’s Internet
usage has been steadily rising since late 1990’s and in 2005 it was estimated that about
9.4 percent of Russian adults were using the Internet at least once a week. 265 According
to D.J. Petersen, Director of Corporate Advisory Services at Eurasia Group, this means
that in 2005 Russia’s Internet penetration percentage was not high enough to be
considered a ‘mass medium. “At more than 20 percent penetration, the Internet is
considered to be a mass medium by commercial service and content providers, and the
Internet starts to become an important element of people’s lives, leading them to watch
less TV and to read fewer newspapers.” 266 In 2007, that number reached 25 percent. 267
The Government
The Russian government has repeatedly indicated that it understands the impact
that ICT is capable of having on society. Despite lacking funds, the authorities have
invested quite a bit into incorporating ICT into the various governmental functions.
Since early 1990s, the Russian government has been transforming the way it collects
taxes by investing millions in IT at the Ministry of Taxes and Collections, upgrading the
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information and communication infrastructure at the Russian Railways Ministry,
upgrading geographic information systems at the State Land Survey, and investing more
than $1.5 billion on various projects with the Ministry of Education and Science. 268
However, while the Yeltsin administration certainly paid attention to ICT, it
became a real priority for the Russian government during the early years of the Putin
administration. Following the takeover of NTV in 2001, Vladimir Putin proceeded to
close TV-6, “another independent station to which many former NTV staff flocked after
NTV’s seizure.” 269 Shortly after, the government closed down a third station, TVS. 270
With the current situation being that Kremlin controls all Television networks in Russia
except for RTVi which is a small station owned by Vladimir Gusinski, a former media
mogul, who has been exiled from Russia and uses the station to reach Russian-speaking
expatriates from around the globe. 271
In spring of 2001, Vladimir Putin held a widely publicized internet conference
during which individuals from Russia and abroad were able to submit questions for the
Russian president, which he in turn attempted to answer. One of the outcomes of this
internet conference was the creation of the Electronic Russia (E-Russia) program, which
is aimed at increasing the level of ICT throughout Russian government in order to
increase government effectiveness and efficiency. 272 Shortly after the federal
government’s decision to implement ICT throughout its branches, many regional and

268

Peterson, “Russia and the Information Revolution,” 50.

269

McFaul, “Civil Society,” 168.

270

Ibid., 169.

271

Trenin, Getting Russia Right, 20.

272

Peterson, “Russia and the Information Revolution,” 50-51.

84

local governments followed suit. “In 2004, federal government annual spending on
information technologies and services rose to more than $640 million. Government
spending on IT at all levels in 2004 amounted to an estimated $1.8 billion or about 0.3
percent of the GDP; this rate compares favorably with a number of other countries in
recent years.” 273 Furthermore, since July 2003, all federal agencies in Russia have to
“publish 40 categories of information online, including laws and regulations, draft
legislation, and repealed legislation; information about agency programs, meetings, news
conferences, and speeches; and biographical information about officials, including their
travel itineraries.” Many government agencies are also required to post job openings on
their websites in an attempt to control preferential hiring. 274
One of the positive outcomes of these efforts by the federal and local
governments is that Russian citizens now have access to decisions that are impacting
their everyday lives. “When legislative proposals appear online, policy activists (such as
those concerned about welfare benefits, the environment, conscripted personnel, and
information technology) have greater opportunity to critique them.” 275 According to an
article by Ambassador James Collins and Anton Ivanov, Chief Justice of the Russian
Supreme Arbitrazh Court,
“The Arbitrazh Courts have initiated administrative changes to help increase
transparency. Court rulings are now disseminated online, and an effort is
underway to digitize most court documents and make them available on the
internet. Leaders of the Court are also working towards using the internet as an
effective tool to curb corruption by publishing all correspondence received by
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judges pertaining to cases before their bench. […] Possibilities of using cellular
phone technology are also being explored.” 276
In addition to this, there are many other initiatives at the Federal and regional
level aimed at improving the flow of information, improving transparency, and increasing
efficiency throughout Russia. According to Dr. Jeffrey Cochrane, at USAID Information
Technology Team, the benefits of ICT can be seen in a number of areas including the
Environment, Procurement, Legal Systems, Agriculture, Education, and Energy. 277 It is
difficult to estimate the effect that all of these efforts will have on Russia’s development,
but its benefits are generally positive. That being said, however, much still has to be
done.
The Society
In order to understand Russian society today, it is necessary to take a historical
and cultural approach. Throughout Soviet times, Russia’s citizens were ceaselessly
bombarded with government propaganda via the printed press and radio, which were the
most common media formats in Russia before popularization of television. As a result,
“Russian society has often come to perceive the media as a continuation of
politics by the ‘dirty means’ of kompromat, as a tool for the squaring of accounts
in the struggle between the powerful of the world, people who are indifferent to
the everyday needs and cares of ordinary readers. An atmosphere has arisen in
the mass media that does not reflect public interests at all, but only private
interests that are divorced from the real feelings, moods, and preferences of the
overwhelming majority of the country’s population.” 278
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Furthermore, according to The Economist, only 28 percent of Russians thought that
media coverage was objective in January, 2009. 279
To an outsider this might seem like a horrible situation, but the reality is that
“there is still precious little demand for democracy” in Russia. Instead of focusing on
politics, most Russians are turning to more ‘practical matters’. 280 In Getting Russia
Right, Dmitri Trenin writes that although today’s Russians are “apathetic toward politics,
[they are] avid consumers, aiming to improve their personal lives. This is a major
development. On TV, the public demands around-the-clock entertainment rather than
politics. The widening network of shopping malls across Russia is a symbol of the
spread of the emerging middle classes.” 281 This is one of the main reasons why Putin
continuously has such high approval among Russians despite taking away the various
freedoms that one considers essential in the West. According to Ian Bremmer, “Putin’s
chief ambition as Russian president has been to build Russia into an economic
powerhouse. He has argued that developing Russia’s economic muscle will allow
Moscow to reassert itself politically—in its traditional sphere of influence and
beyond.” 282
The other side of this is that Russians today are also very concerned with national
sovereignty and they are willing to give up many of their freedoms at home as long as
they are not being pressured by foreign powers. This can clearly be seen from the rising
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levels of nationalism across Russia, particularly with younger people. Kremlin has been
exploiting this nationalism, and has created numerous organizations for young people,
including Nashi (Ours), which is a youth organization that promotes support for Putin.
From lavish summer camps to privileged internships with the government and top
businesses, Kremlin is very careful about making sure that it has the support of the young
people. At summer camps, they are told that “the Orange Revolution [in Ukraine] was a
foreign plot, and that President Yushchenko was poisoned by his supporters to win
sympathy.” Moreover, they are told that “Russia’s foreign and internal enemies will try
to instigate a similar revolution [in Russia]. They [the US] have tried it before, and soon
they will try it here, perhaps as early as the Moscow Duma elections this autumn. Your
job is to defend the constitutional order if and when the coup comes.” 283 Efforts like
these have been very successful, which are evident in statements like the one by 16-year
old Moscow resident, Ksenia. “We don’t want a revolution here. We want to make the
country stronger.” 284 Furthermore, according to a statement by Nashi leader, Nikita
Borovikov, to the Moscow Times in April 2009, “Regime change in our country is
impossible, because Russia’s leadership is not passive and cowardly.” 285
While previously the Russian government spent most of their time and resources
focused on radio, print and television, due to Internet’s low penetration rates, recently the
Russian authorities have been taking very aggressive steps towards increasing their
Internet presence. “Allies of President Vladimir Putin are creating pro-government news
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and pop culture Web sites while purchasing some established online outlets known for
independent journalism. They are nurturing a network of friendly bloggers ready to
disseminate propaganda on command. And there is talk of creating a new Russian
computer network—one that would be separate form the Internet at large and, potentially,
much easier to control.” 286
Another big reason for this change in focus occurred in 2004, after the events that
took place in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Russian authorities got to witness firsthand
how “blogs and uncensored online publications helped drive a popular uprising in
Ukraine after a pro-Moscow candidate was declared the winner of a presidential
election.” 287 In their Washington Post article, writers Anton Troianovski and Peter Finn
provide an excellent example of this phenomenon:
“On April 14, an opposition movement held a march in central Moscow that drew
hundreds of people; police detained at least 170, including the leader of the
march, chess star Garry Kasparov. Pavel Danilin, a 30-year-old Putin supporter
and blogger whose online icon is the fearsome robot of the Terminator movie,
works for a political consulting company loyal to the Kremlin. He said he and his
team, which included people from a youth movement called the Young Guard,
quickly started blogging that day about a smaller, pro-Kremlin march held at the
same time. They linked to one another repeatedly and soon, Danilin said, posts
about the pro-Kremlin march had crowded out all the items about the opposition
march on the Yandex Web portal’s coveted ranking of the top five Russian blog
posts. “We played it beautifully,” Danilin said.” 288
According to Sharon LaFraniere of The Washington Post, in theory, Russia’s legal
system provides its citizens with many of the same rights that are enjoyed in the U.S.
“Both the Russian constitution and a 1995 law prohibit law enforcement agencies from
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monitoring phone calls, pager messages, radio transmissions, e-mails or Internet traffic
without a court order. But in practice, court orders are little more than legal niceties in
Russia. An obscure set of technical regulations issued in the late 1990s 289 permits total
access without ever approaching a judge.” 290 According to Nail Murzhakhanov, director
of Bayard-Slavia Communications in Volgograd, if he decides to comply with FSB
requests and provides them with everything that they’ve asked him for, “they could very
easily have read all the clients’ passwords. And once they learned the passwords, they
could have controlled online all the e-mail traffic. They could have read or rewritten an
e-mail even before the receiver got it, and the user would never know.” 291 In this case,
Murzhakhanov refused to sign the FSB’s request, a move that caused him financial loss
and resulted in a number of restrictions placed on his business, however, most of the
times, the Internet service providers simply comply with FSB orders. Furthermore,
Russian “prosecutors have [also] begun to target postings on blogs or Internet chat sites,
charging users with slander or extremism after they criticize Putin or other officials.
Most such incidents have occurred outside Moscow, and federal officials deny that they
signal any broader campaign to control the Internet.” 292
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Conclusion
According to an article by Nikolai Petrov in The Moscow Times, a number of
different protests and demonstrations happened throughout Russia in February 2009.
“Many different organizations participated in the anti-government protests, including the
Federation of Automobile Owners, the Communist Part, the Left Front, The Other
Russia, Solidarity, the United Civil Front, the Communist Youth Union, the National
Assembly, the banned National Bolshevik Party, and Yabloko.” 293 In addition to this, as
we can see in a number of different publications 294 , the Russian government has adapted
their tactics to the current nature of protests. We see less and less violent intervention by
the government putting down protesters, 295 as the government is beginning to utilize the
same organizational tactics as the protesters and hold their own counter-protests in
support of Kremlin. 296 In the words of Dmitri Trenin, “Democracy is a fairly late child
of capitalism. It is usually preceded by a period of liberal and constitutional
development. There are few shortcuts here, but the process itself, driven by interests, is
by and large reliable.” 297
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Chapter 8:
Conclusion
“While in the past, political leaders could get away with [bad]
behavior, we have now moved into a revolutionary new world.
All over the planet executive and bureaucratic hierarchies are
being challenged by increasingly empowered and informed
electorates, as well as by e-enabled protest. Voters want service
and ongoing accountability, not dictation and top down
arrogance. And if they cannot get it they will employ ways other
than through voting and party politics to satisfy their needs.”
Lord Howell of Guildford,
Opposition Spokesman on Foreign Affairs,
United Kingdom 298

There is an increasing awareness among governments and individuals that they
have the capacity to combat various forms of discrimination, injustice, deceit and
corruption that are present in their societies. In addition to this, citizens around the world
are realizing that they have the power and technological capabilities to challenge
powerful political figures and corrupt governments. The Internet, cell phones,
videophones, blogging, podcasts, camcorders and other Information Communication
Technologies are providing regular individuals with unprecedented capacity to voice their
opinions, organize social protests, challenge corrupt regimes and initiate change in a way
that has not been possible before. With decreases in communication costs, and increases
in access to information, this is a perfect opportunity for individuals and governments
alike, to explore the various ways in which “the Internet and media can be used positively
to create forms of globalization that generate social justice.” 299 At the same time,
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however, it is up to the individuals and the governments to initiate positive political
change in their countries. Although ICTs certainly make the task at hand easier, the
responsibility to utilize these technologies in a positive way rests with mankind.
Many individuals, however, are not as optimistic about the ‘color revolutions’ that
have been taking place in the former Soviet Bloc over the past 20 years, or ICTs ability to
make change. In an article in OpenDemocracy.net Vassela Tcherneva, senior policy
fellow at the European council on Foreign Relations writes:
“The “orange” and “rose” revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia have been widely
cited as precedents of Moldova’s ‘Twitter Revolution.’ These however have
become less than inspiring comparisons, for the current condition of both
countries’ democracies is bleak. Ukraine, amid endemic political turmoil and on
the brink of economic collapse, could turn into the biggest failed state in Europe.
Georgia, amid rooted political polarization and distrust, faces constant street
protests against Mikheil Saakashvili’s authoritarian tendencies (including curbs
on the independence of Georgian courts and media, and intimidation of the
opposition) and discontent over his handling of the war with Russia in August.” 300
As a result, the increased level of control and authoritarianism that we are seeing in many
countries, is making it much more difficult for individuals to create any type of an
opposition movement. Furthermore, many of these countries are also prohibiting foreign
NGOs from acting within their borders. The reason for this is clear: had any of the
countries in the former Soviet Union that experienced revolutions been true dictatorships,
it is very unlikely that these revolutions would have occurred. Leaders that took control
after the revolutions understand this, and so do leaders like Vladimir Putin.
In addition to this, many point to the fact that while individuals certainly have
access to more ICTs, the authoritarian governments also utilize ICTs as countermeasures
against dissenters. However, according to Gladys Ganley the “governments have always
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had such powers and these new ones are merely relative. The important change is one of
balance, and the scale, previously always tilted toward the government’s side, has at least
for the moment tipped toward the individual.” 301
There are also some individuals that argue that all of these revolutions are simply
the result of manipulation by the U.S. and other Western powers attempting to contain
Russia. However, while organizations from the U.S. and other western countries have
certainly been involved in each revolution that took place in the former Soviet Union,
their impact on what actually took place need not be overstated. Their contribution,
while significant in helping many groups organize, is not the main factor driving these
revolutionary movements. In each instance the movements were driven by local
populations, and they have been increasingly independent with every attempt. While in
Georgia foreign involvement was a primary factor in fueling the opposition, the
Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution had more local support. This is even more so in the case
of Kyrgyzstan, and the most recent ‘Twitter Revolution’ in Moldova, where foreign
support, although present, was very minimal.
In conclusion, it is still early to determine the long-term effects of these
revolutions, but their importance cannot be overstated. If these countries are eventually
successful in increasing the level of democracy and raising the economic level for their
citizens, it will be a positive example for other countries to follow. If, on the other hand,
the leadership of these countries fails to live up to the promises they made when they
were leaders of these opposition movements, then this will also be a sign for oppressive
regimes everywhere, allowing them to feel more stable and secure as they continue to
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rule their country in a way that is beneficial to a select few and not for the benefit of their
people.
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS,
CONCPTS AND INDIVIDUALS

ASKAR AKAEV: President of Kyrgyzstan until March, 2005, when he was ousted by
the Kyrgyz opposition during the Tulip Revolution. He was replaced by President
Kurmanbek Bakiev.
AUTOCRACY: Form of government in which all political powers are held by a single
individual.
B-92: Anti-Milosevic radio station in Serbia that provided listeners with a view that was
not controlled by the government. The radio station received much of its funding from
foreign sources and was crucial in overthrowing Slobodan Milosevic.
BALKAN SATES: A geopolitical region which includes Bulgaria, Romania, Albania,
and former Yugoslav Republics (except Slovenia).
BALTIC STATES: A geopolitical region which includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
BLOG: Popularized in the late 1990s, blogs are websites which typically belong to an
individual or an organization where one posts regular entries. The term is a contraction
of Web Log, and is oftentimes used to post news items and images, which are then
discussed by blog visitors.
THE CAUCASUS: A geopolitical region located between Europe, Asia and the Middle
East. The Caucasus consist of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and adjacent parts of
Russia.
CENTRAL ASIA: A geopolitical region comprised of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
CIVIL SOCIETY: Voluntary social and civic organizations that are the basis of a free
society. Civil Society is an essential element in opposing authoritarian regimes.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS): A regional
organization which is headed by the Russian Federation and includes most of the former
USSR (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan).
COMMUNISM: A form of socialism that is based on collectivism instead of free
market and private ownership.
CAPITALISM: An economic system based on private ownership of capital goods and
on competition in a free market.
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DEMOCRACY: Although there is no agreed on definition, democracy typically refers
to a political system in which the power lies with the people, who then choose their
representation via free elections.
DUMA: The State Duma is the lower house of the Federal Assembly (parliament) of
Russia and consists of 450 members.
EASTERN EUROPE: A geopolitical region that includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania,
Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.
E-GOVERNMENT: Short for Electronic Government, E-Government refers to the use
of ICT in providing various government services in order to increase transparency,
efficiency and effectiveness.
FACEBOOK: Founded on February 4, 2004, Facebook is a social networking site that
provides millions of users around the world with unprecedented ability to organize and
communicate with each other. According to the website, “Facebook’s mission is to give
people the power to share and make the world more open and connected.” Facebook
played an important role in Moldova’s ‘Twitter Revolution.’
FLICKR: An online photo management and sharing application that allows users to
make their content available to anyone, anywhere, around the world. Flickr played an
important role in Moldova’s ‘Twitter Revolution’ by allowing protesters to post images
of the events which were seen around the world.
FREEDOM: Although there is no agreed on definition, Nobel Prize-winning economist
Amartya Sen, breaks down the idea of freedom into five different concepts: political
freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and
protective security.
FREEDOM HOUSE: A U.S.-based, non-profit and non-partisan organization, whose
mission is to promote democracy and freedom around the world. Freedom House
accomplishes this via a wide range of publications and international programs that are
partially funded by the U.S. government. Freedom House played an important role in the
color revolutions.
GEOPOLITICS: A concept that originated in the early 20th century, and emphasizes
the importance of geography on politics and foreign affairs. Many scholars argue that
geopolitics is the central factor behind U.S. interventions in the former Soviet bloc.
GLASNOST: Russian for ‘openness,’ Glasnost was a Soviet policy introduced by
Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986 that allowed open discussion of political and social issues,
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and provided more freedoms for the media. Many argue that Glasnost was an essential
factor behind the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
GLOBALIZATION: The process of integrating the various countries and individuals
into a single ‘global’ society. Globalization is a key factor in fueling opposition
movements around the world.
HARD POWER: Power obtained from use of the military and economic sanctions.
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT): An umbrella
term that includes all technology utilized for communication purposes.
THE INTERNATIOAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI): U.S.-based, non-profit
and non-partisan organization, whose mission is to advance “democracy worldwide by
developing political parties, civic institutions, open elections, good governance and the
rule of law.” IRI receives nearly 100 percent of its funding from the U.S. State
Department and played an important role in the revolutionary movements throughout the
former USSR.
KELKEL: Meaning ‘Renaissance,’ Kelkel was a Kyrgyz youth movement that was
modeled after Otpor, Kmara and Pora movements.
KMARA: Meaning ‘Enough,’ Kmara was a Georgian youth movement created by the
Liberty Institute and modeled after Serbia’s Otpor movement. Kmara played an
important role in overthrowing Shevardnadze and bringing Saakashvili to power.
THE LIBERTY INSTITUTE: Open Society Institute-backed NGO that was part of the
opposition movement against Eduard Shevardnadze. Also helped create the Kmara youth
movement.
MANAGED DEMOCRACY: A phenomenon that occurs when the ruling elite
maintain an appearance of democracy by allowing certain freedoms to exist, but do
everything in their power to restrict these freedoms. In a managed democracy, the
government holds elections, but controls their outcome.
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (NDI): A U.S.-based, non-profit and nonpartisan organization, whose mission is to “support and strengthen democratic institutions
worldwide through citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.”
NDI played an important role in the revolutionary movements throughout the former
USSR, and receives most of its funding from the U.S. government.
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (NED): A non-profit agency
funded by the U.S. government, whose mission is to promote democracy around the
world. NED provided funding to a number of organizations that were leading the
opposition movements in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova.
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OTPOR: A Serbian youth movement that was funded by the U.S. government and
played an important role in protests against Slobodan Milosevic. Meaning ‘Resistance,’
Otpor was a model for Pora, Kmara and KelKel youth movements in Ukraine, Georgia
and Kyrgyzstan, respectively.
PERESTROIKA: Russian for ‘restructuring,’ Perestroika was a set of political and
economic reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. Many argue that
Perestroika was an essential factor behind the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
PORA: Meaning ‘It’s time,’ Pora was a Ukrainian youth movement that led the
opposition against Yanukovych. Pora was partially funded by the U.S. government and
modeled after Otpor and Kmara movements.
RUSTAVI 2: An independent television in Georgia that was central in fueling the
opposition movement during the ‘Rose Revolution.’
SAMIZDAT: According to H. Gordon Skilling, samizdat is “the distribution of
uncensored writings on one’s own, without the medium of a publishing house and
without permission of the authorities…Although there are examples of samizdat in
eighteenth and nineteenth century Russia, the term first emerged in late 1950s, “when a
Moscow poet described the bound, typewritten publication of his poem, ‘Samsebyaizdat,’
i.e., ‘publishing house for oneself.’ The same poet coined the term samizdat, with the
same meaning. It was the latter word which came into general usage to refer to unofficial
publications of all kinds and to the entire process of unofficial publication. There is no
English equivalent, other than the awkward ‘self-publication.’” 302
SOFT POWER: Power obtained from the use of diplomacy and co-option.
GEORGE SOROS: A billionaire philanthropist and founder of Open Society Institute.
Soros has provided billions of dollars to various pro-democracy organizations around the
world. Many consider Soros to be one of the key supporters of the revolutionary
movements in Eastern Europe.
TWITTER: Twitter is a social networking site that provides users with an ability to
organize and stay connected through an exchange of quick messages. Twitter played a
central role in Moldova’s ‘Twitter Revolution.’
YUGOSLAVIA (FORMER): Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established
in 1946 and consisted of six republics (Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Macedonia).
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Figure 1: Georgia in 2003
Background

Area
Population
Ethnic Groups
Religions
Languages

Literacy
Legal System
GDP (Per Capita)
Labor Force
Telephones (main
lines in use)
Telephones
(mobile cellular)
Radio Broadcast
Stations
Television
Broadcast Stations
Internet Hosts
Internet Users

Georgia was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th century.
Independent for three years (1918-1921) following the Russian
revolution, it was forcibly incorporated into the USSR until the
Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. Ethnic separation in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, poor governance, and Russian military bases deny
the government effective control over the entirety of the state's
internationally recognized territory. Despite myriad problems, some
progress on market reforms and democratization has been made. An
attempt by the government to manipulate legislative elections in
November 2003 touched off widespread protests that led to the
resignation of Eduard SHEVARDNADZE, president since 1995.
Total: 69,700 sq km
4,693,892 (July 2004 est.)
Georgian 70.1%, Armenian 8.1%, Russian 6.3%, Azeri 5.7%,
Ossetian 3%, Abkhaz 1.8%, other 5%
Georgian Orthodox 65%, Muslim 11%, Russian Orthodox 10%,
Armenian Apostolic 8%, unknown 6%
Georgian 71% (official), Russian 9%, Armenian 7%, Azeri 6%,
other 7%
note: Abkhaz is the official language in Abkhazia
Total population: 99% (male: 100%; female: 98%) (1999 est.)
Definition: age 15 and over can read and write
Based on civil law system
$2,500 (2003 est.)
2.1 million (2001 est.)
648,500 (2002)
503,600 (2002)
AM 7, FM 12, shortwave 4 (1998)
12 (plus repeaters) (1998)
3,032 (2002)
73,500 (2002)

Source: The CIA World Factbook, 2004
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Figure 2: Ukraine in 2004
Background

Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine was able
to bring about a short-lived period of independence (1917-20), but
was re-conquered and forced to endure a brutal Soviet rule that
engineered two artificial famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which
over 8 million died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies
were responsible for some 7 to 8 million more deaths. Although
final independence for Ukraine was achieved in 1991 with the
dissolution of the USSR, democracy remained elusive as the legacy
of state control and endemic corruption stalled efforts at economic
reform, privatization, and civil liberties.

Area
Population
Ethnic Groups

Total: 603,700 sq km
47,425,336 (July 2005 est.)
Ukrainian 77.8%, Russian 17.3%, Belarusian 0.6%, Moldovan
0.5%, Crimean Tatar 0.5%, Bulgarian 0.4%, Hungarian 0.3%,
Romanian 0.3%, Polish 0.3%, Jewish 0.2%, other 1.8% (2001)
Ukrainian Orthodox - Kiev Patriarchate 19%, Orthodox (no
particular jurisdiction) 16%, Ukrainian Orthodox - Moscow
Patriarchate 9%, Ukrainian Greek Catholic 6%, Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox 1.7%, Protestant, Jewish, none 38% (2004
est.)
Ukrainian (official) 67%, Russian 24%; small Romanian-, Polish-,
and Hungarian-speaking minorities
Total population: 99.7% (male: 99.8%; female: 99.6%) (2003 est.)
Definition: age 15 and over can read and write
Based on civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts
$6,300 (2004 est.)
21.11 million (2004 est.)
10,833,300 (2002)

Religions

Languages
Literacy
Legal System
GDP (Per Capita)
Labor Force
Telephones (main
lines in use)
Telephones
(mobile cellular)
Radio Broadcast
Stations
Television
Broadcast Stations
Internet Hosts
Internet Users

4.2 million (2002)
AM 134, FM 289, shortwave 4 (1998)
At least 33 (plus 21 repeaters that relay broadcasts from Russia)
(1997)
94,345 (2004)
3.8 million (2003)

Source: The CIA World Factbook, 2005
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Figure 3: Kyrgyzstan in 2005
Background

Area
Population
Ethnic Groups
Religions
Languages
Literacy
Legal System
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Television
Broadcast Stations
Internet Hosts
Internet Users

A Central Asian country of incredible natural beauty and proud
nomadic traditions, Kyrgyzstan was annexed by Russia in 1864; it
achieved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Nationwide
demonstrations in the spring of 2005 resulted in the ouster of
President Askar AKAYEV, who had run the country since 1990.
Subsequent presidential elections in July 2005 were won
overwhelmingly by former prime minister Kurmanbek BAKIYEV.
Current concerns include: privatization of state-owned enterprises,
expansion of democracy and political freedoms, reduction of
corruption, improving interethnic relations, and combating
terrorism.
Total: 198,500 sq km
5,146,281 (July 2005 est.)
Kyrgyz 64.9%, Uzbek 13.8%, Russian 12.5%, Dungan 1.1%,
Ukrainian 1%, Uygur 1%, other 5.7% (1999 census)
Muslim 75%, Russian Orthodox 20%, other 5%
Kyrgyz (official), Russian (official)
Total population: 97% (male: 99%; female: 96%) (1989 est.)
Definition: age 15 and over can read and write
Based on civil law system
$2,100 (2005 est.)
2.7 million (2000)
416,400 (2004)
263,400 (2004)
AM 12 (plus 10 repeater stations), FM 14, shortwave 2 (1998)
NA (repeater stations throughout the country relay programs from
Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey) (1997)
18,539 (2005)
263,000 (2005)

Source: The CIA World Factbook, 2005, 2006
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Figure 4: Moldova in 2009
Background
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Part of Romania during the interwar period, Moldova was
incorporated into the Soviet Union at the close of World War II.
Although independent from the USSR since 1991, Russian forces
have remained on Moldovan territory east of the Dniester River
supporting the Slavic majority population, mostly Ukrainians and
Russians, who have proclaimed a "Transnistria" republic. One of
the poorest nations in Europe, Moldova became the first former
Soviet state to elect a Communist as its president in 2001.
total: 33,843 sq km (country comparison to the world: 146)
4,320,748 (July 2009 est.) (country comparison to the world: 123)
Moldovan/Romanian 78.2%, Ukrainian 8.4%, Russian 5.8%,
Gagauz 4.4%, Bulgarian 1.9%, other 1.3% (2004 census)
Eastern Orthodox 98%, Jewish 1.5%, Baptist and other 0.5%
(2000)
Moldovan (official, virtually the same as the Romanian language),
Russian, Gagauz (a Turkish dialect)
Total population: 99.1% (male: 99.7%; female: 98.6%) (2005 est.)
Definition: age 15 and over can read and write
Based on civil law system; Constitutional Court reviews legality
of legislative acts and governmental decisions of resolution;
accepts many UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) documents; has not accepted compulsory ICJ
jurisdiction
$2,500 (2008 est.) (country comparison to the world: 172)
note: data are in 2008 US dollars
1.327 million (2008 est.) (country comparison to the world: 126)
1.08 million (2007)
country comparison to the world: 76
1.883 million (2007)
country comparison to the world: 115
AM 2, FM 29, shortwave NA (2006)
40 (2006)
223,869 (2008) (country comparison to the world: 57)
700,000 (2007) (country comparison to the world: 94)

Source: The CIA World Factbook, 2009.
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Figure 5: Russia in 2009
Background
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The Soviet economy and society stagnated in the following decades
until General Secretary Mikhail GORBACHEV (1985-91)
introduced glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) in an
attempt to modernize Communism, but his initiatives inadvertently
released forces that by December 1991 splintered the USSR into
Russia and 14 other independent republics. Since then, Russia has
shifted its post-Soviet democratic ambitions in favor of a
centralized semi-authoritarian state whose legitimacy is buttressed,
in part, by carefully managed national elections, former President
PUTIN's genuine popularity, and the prudent management of
Russia's windfall energy wealth. Russia has severely disabled a
Chechen rebel movement, although violence still occurs throughout
the North Caucasus.
Total: 17,075,200 sq km
140,041,247 (July 2009 est.)
Russian 79.8%, Tatar 3.8%, Ukrainian 2%, Bashkir 1.2%, Chuvash
1.1%, other or unspecified 12.1% (2002 census)
Russian Orthodox 15-20%, Muslim 10-15%, other Christian 2%
(2006 est.)
note: estimates are of practicing worshipers; Russia has large
populations of non-practicing believers and non-believers, a legacy
of over seven decades of Soviet rule
Russian, many minority languages
Total population: 99.4% (male: 99.7%; female: 99.2%) (2002)
Definition: age 15 and over can read and write
Based on civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts; has
not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
$15,800 (2008 est.)
75.7 million (2008 est.) ( country comparison to the world: 7)
43.9 million (2006)
country comparison to the world: 6
170 million (2007)
country comparison to the world: 5
AM 323, FM 1,500 est., shortwave 62 (2004)
7,306 (1998)
4.822 million (2008) (country comparison to the world: 15)
30 million (2007) (country comparison to the world: 12)

Source: The CIA World Factbook, 2009.
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